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Regulation, “Republican Moments,” and Energy
Policy Reform
David B. Spence



During the last half decade or so, energy policy reform has made
its way to the top of the American policymaking agenda, driven by a
groundswell of concern over environmental issues (primarily climate
change), energy security issues, and the desire for a more efficient
and reliable energy delivery system. This groundswell has produced
some recent policy changes, but they have not been enough to satisfy
proponents of reform, who remain frustrated with the unwillingness
of Congress to pass legislation aimed at fundamentally changing the
way Americans produce and consume energy. This Article examines
the reasons why fundamental energy policy reform has been so
difficult.
Part I explores the historical context to the current reform
debate, beginning with the energy policy reforms enacted in the
1970s. Part II examines more closely the current logic of reform,
including the reasons why Congress is considering such fundamental
energy policy change now, and the menu of policy instruments
under consideration. Part III examines the political logic that
governs legislative action and the contextual and issue-based reasons
why the energy policy reforms under consideration are particularly
difficult for Congress to enact compared with major regulatory
reforms of the past. I argue here that Congress is capable of enacting
regulatory reforms over the objections of well-organized interests
(so-called “republican moments”), but Congress is particularly illequipped (or disinclined) to do so when, as here: (i) the issues are
technically and politically complex, making the benefits of reform (or
costs of inaction) seem unclear and remote to many voters, and (ii)
the costs of reform fall upon current voters while many of the
benefits accrue to others. Part IV offers some brief concluding
. Associate Professor of Law, Politics & Regulation, McCombs School of Business,
University of Texas at Austin. The Author would like to thank Buzz Thompson, Michael
Wara, and all the participants in the Stanford Environmental Law Seminar for their comments
on an earlier draft of this Article, and Kelly Cavazos, Amanda Onwuka, and Brian Tomasovic
for their research assistance during its preparation.
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thoughts about the kinds of developments that might change the
current political dynamic so as to make reform more likely.
I. WHERE WE’VE BEEN: REFORM AND THE PATH TO (MORE)
REFORM
A. Regulatory Activity, 1970-2000
It has been approximately three decades since Congress, the
President, and regulators last sought to fundamentally change the
way Americans produce and consume energy. In the 1970s
policymakers were motivated by environmental and energy security
concerns. Environmentalism was at its peak as a motivating force for
legislation in the 1970s, producing the Clean Air Act of 1970,1 the
Clean Water Act of 1972,2 and major hazardous waste legislation.3
These new regulatory regimes imposed new pollution control costs
on fossil fuels, requiring automobiles and industry alike to comply
with new emissions standards. Meanwhile, the formation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)4 and the
resultant oil shocks of the 1970s heightened energy security
concerns, as did the widespread perception that the United States
was running out of natural gas.5 The result was a portfolio of
1. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.).
3. The two major statutes are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(regulating the ongoing management of hazardous waste), and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94
Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (regulating the cleanup of
the inactive hazardous waste sites).
4. During the 1970s, OPEC boycotts and production restrictions caused price
volatility in oil markets, gasoline shortages, and rationing in the United States, as well as an
increase in the market price of oil from less than four dollars a barrel to more than thirty dollars
a barrel in 1981. For a good explanation of these developments see DANIEL YERGIN, THE
PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 501–681 (1991).
5. In the early 1970s U.S. proven reserves of natural gas had fallen to a little over two
hundred trillion cubic feet. At that time, American consumption was in the neighborhood of
twenty trillion cubic feet a year, leading some analysts to state that the United States had only
ten years’ worth of natural gas supply in reserve. See, e.g., Ed Edelson, Why We’re Running Out
of Gasoline, POPULAR SCI., Apr. 1973, at 82, 83. Writing six months before the oil embargo
Edelson observed, “If you haven’t noticed, we’re running out of natural gas. Reserves dropped
by 7.1 percent in 1971, the fourth straight year in which the U.S. used more gas than was
discovered.” Id.
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legislation and regulatory initiatives that represented, collectively, an
attempt to reduce the United States’ dependence on oil and steer the
economy toward cleaner and more efficient energy alternatives.
This legislative trend began in 1975 when Congress created
national fuel economy standards for automobiles known as “CAFE
standards.”6 That same year Congress established the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve, the culmination of an effort on the part of the
Nixon and Ford administrations to build up a reserve supply of oil to
be used during future supply interruptions.7 The Reserve stores oil in
various places throughout the United States and retains the capacity
to provide about a month’s worth of oil consumption.8 Beginning in
1977, the Carter Administration made energy policy a priority,
creating the new Department of Energy9 and securing the passage of
a legislative package that addressed supply and shortage concerns in
several ways. First, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)10
deregulated the price of natural gas at the wellhead, ultimately
stimulating both the discovery of new domestic sources of gas and
greater efficiency in natural gas markets.11 The Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)12 promoted conservation
and “alternative” forms of electricity production by providing
financial incentives to new, nonutility producers of renewable
6. These standards imposed average fuel economy requirements for cars, light trucks,
and SUVs. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). “CAFE” stands for “corporate
average fuel economy.”
7. BRUCE A. BEAUBOUEF, THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE 15, 29 (2007). The
Strategic Petroleum Reserve was also a part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975. Id.
8. The United States Department of Energy manages the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
For more information about the Reserve, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, STRATEGIC PETROLEUM
RES., http://www.spr.doe.gov (last visited Aug. 18, 2011).
9. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7111–7112, 7131 (2006)).
10. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11. Prior to the NGPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had been
attempting to regulate prices at the wellhead, having been ordered to do so by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1950s. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 684–85
(1954). For a good summary of the NGPA, its purpose and its consequences, see Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 87–88
(1982).
12. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and
43 U.S.C.).
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electricity and cogeneration.13 The Carter energy package included
investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation for alternative
energy projects,14 along with PURPA’s powerful mandate that
electric utilities purchase power from alternative energy producers
(so-called “qualifying facilities” or “QFs”) at favorable rates. 15 The
Carter Administration’s last energy hurrah was the creation of the
short-lived Synfuels Corporation in 1980, which provided federal
seed money for research into synthetic fuels.16 While the corporation
was abolished five years later, many of the ideas that germinated
under its care have been put into practice since.17
Following the Carter administration’s lead, state legislatures and
regulators began to more actively promote conservation and cleaner
energy. State public utility commissions, using their leverage over
utility rates, began to mandate that utilities undertake investments in
conservation18 and that utilities focus more on demand-side
reductions in usage as another way of balancing supply and demand
(along with the construction of new sources of electricity).19 In the
13. PURPA defined “alternative” energy facilities to include various forms of renewable
energy like solar, wind, and geothermal, as well as small hydroelectric facilities and
cogeneration plants. Cogeneration facilities produce electricity as well as usable heat energy,
and most of the many hundreds of cogeneration facilities built after the passage of PURPA in
the 1980s were gas-fired. 16 U.S.C § 824a–3 (2006).
14. The Carter tax credits expired during the Reagan administration. In 1992, Congress
established a production tax credit for renewable energy projects in the Energy Policy Act of
1992. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 16, 38, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). Congress has intermittently renewed shortterm investment and/or production tax credits for renewable energy ever since, and
production credits still remain in effect. Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat.
3174 (codified in scattered sections of 23 and 26 U.S.C.).
15. Under PURPA, electric utilities were required to purchase power from certain
qualified facilities at “avoided cost,” the cost to the utilities of providing power from a new
generating facility of their own. 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3 (2006).
16. The Synthetic Fuels Corporation was established as part of the Energy Security Act
of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30
and 42 U.S.C.).
17. Janet Raloff, Washington Deals Synfuels a Big Blow, 128 SCI. NEWS 87, 87 (1985);
U.S. Treasury Takes Over Existing Synfuels Contracts, 63 PLATT’S OILGRAM NEWS 4, 4 (1985)
(reporting President Reagan’s signature of legislation abolishing the corporation). Ideas
incubated at the Synfuels Corp. include specific processes for creating liquid transportation fuel
from coal (so-called “coal to liquids” or “CTL” processes) and natural gas (“gas to liquids,” or
“GTL” processes).
18. For a discussion of these state efforts, see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 967–84 (3d ed. 2010).
19. Some states went so far as to adopt something called “integrated resources
planning,” under which utilities must undertake demand-side investments in conservation to
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1980s and 90s states began establishing “renewable portfolio
standards” (RPS), requiring electric utilities to buy a specified
percentage (or, in some cases, amount) of electricity from renewable
sources.20 State RPS vary widely: each defines “renewable energy”
differently and establishes different targets, and range from
Minnesota’s requirement that 25% of all electricity come from
renewables by the year 2025,21 to Texas’s rather modest goals, which
are established not in percentages of power sold but rather in
megawatts of capacity.22
Collectively, these policy developments stimulated a great degree
of entrepreneurial activity in the energy sector. The NGPA paved the
way for the introduction of competitive wholesale markets in the
natural gas industry in the 1980s by stimulating the entry of new gas
producers into the market. PURPA and the Energy Policy Act of
199223 brought to the market new kinds of energy production by
nonutility entrepreneurs—QFs and other so-called “independent
power producers” or “IPPs.” These incentives also helped to bring
down the cost of wind generation, which plummeted in the last
three decades as wind-generated capacity in the United States
increased rapidly.24 Hydroelectric generation also grew significantly
during the 1980s and 90s.25 For its part, solar energy’s growth spurt
meet future imbalances in supply and demand if those demand-side investments are less
expensive than constructing new plants. Id.
20. These targets and definitions of qualified sources vary by state. For up-to-date
information about state RPS, see N.C. Solar Ctr. & The Interstate Renewable Energy Council,
DSIREUSA, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Aug. 18, 2011).
21. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2010).
22. Texas’s goals are modest for two reasons. First, each time the legislature has raised
the target the market has already built nearly that much capacity. Second, the goals are
essentially voluntary, and there are no significant financial consequences for retail energy
providers who fail to meet them. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (West 1999) (amended
2005) (amendment replacing the renewable capacity targets every two years from 2003–2009,
with new targets every two years from 2007–2015).
23. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 721, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2915
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824j) (provision for open access to transmission lines).
24. Troy Helming, Uncle Sam’s New Year’s Resolution, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD
(Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2004/02/unclesams-new-years-resolution-10420; see also ROBERT Y. REDLINGER ET AL., WIND ENERGY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 73–96 (2002) (covering the economics of wind energy and depicting the
increasing efficiencies and decreasing capital and other costs of wind in the 1980s and 90s).
25. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission experienced steady growth in
hydroelectric license applications throughout the early 1980s, most of them small projects
responding to federal incentives. For a summary of these developments, see David B. Spence,
Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 425, 425–72
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was delayed until the early twenty-first century, when advances in the
production of less expensive, more energy-efficient photovoltaic
cells26 and concentrated solar technology finally took hold.27
The rise of nonutility, merchant power producers helped create
the conditions necessary for the move to competitive markets in the
electricity industry in the 1990s. By the turn of the century,
competition and market pricing had largely replaced traditional
public utility regulation of gas and electric wholesale markets in the
United States,28 and approximately twenty states had introduced
retail competition and market pricing in the electric sector. However,
during the California energy crisis of 2000–2001,29 wholesale market
prices for electricity soared to many times historic levels, slowing the
move toward retail competition in the states and keeping regulators
concerned over both the vulnerability of consumers to high and
volatile prices and the ability of the aging electric grid to withstand
the rapid increases in third-party power transactions.30 The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and electric grid managers continue
to experiment with ways to shift demand during peak periods to offpeak periods, obviating the need to build expensive peaking plants.
Many analysts believe that investment in a better, smarter, electric
grid could help solve these problems by providing essential technical
and price information to market participants and regulators alike.31
(1999).
26. Utility scale capacity for solar thermal/PV increased 91 MW in 2007, a 22% national
increase. New capacity in Nevada—including the 64 MW Nevada Solar One (solar thermal)
and a 14 MW PV-plant at Nellis Air Force Base—accounted for 79 MW. See US Solar Installed
Capacity
Sees
Fastest
Growth
in
2010,
BRIGHTSTAR
SOLAR,
http://
www.brightstarsolar.net/2011/03/us-solar-installed-capacity-sees-fastest-growth-in-2010/
(last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
27. See, e.g., Cyrus Moulton, Introducing the Most Efficient Solar Power in the World, 30
DISCOVER MAG. 17, 17 (2009), available at http://discovermagazine.com/2009/oct/08introducing-most-efficient-solar-power-in-world (describing how 38-foot-wide reflective dishes
used Stirling engines to accomplish a 31.25% efficiency benchmark in converting solar thermal
energy to electricity).
28. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 765, 765–66 (2008).
29. Id. at 779–80.
30. Id. at 785–89.
31. Because electricity cannot be stored in large amounts, operators of the grid must
continuously balance supply and demand. A “smarter” grid would provide grid operators with
more information, including granular information, about daily and seasonal changes in demand
and about use of the various segments of the grid. This information could be used to allow
grid operators to balance loads more effectively, thereby preventing the kind of blackouts
experienced in the Northeast and Midwest in 2003; it could also lead to new rate structures to
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Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, changing
environmental requirements put additional cost pressure on fossil
fuels. Increasingly broad and stringent regulation of coal-fired power
plants and oil refineries reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, and particulate matter from those sources.32 More specifically,
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act created the so-called
“acid rain program,” which imposed additional sulfur dioxide
regulation on previously grandfathered coal-fired power plants33
through the first national tradable permit program in the United
States. Several decades of litigation has extended the Clean Air Act’s
stricter emissions standards for other pollutants to those
grandfathered plants.34 Meanwhile, the 1990 amendments also paved
the way for the regulation of toxic mercury emissions from coal-fired
power plants, though that process was also slowed considerably by
litigation.35 In the transportation sector, biofuels began to make
inroads into the transportation fuels market in the 1990s, spurred by
federal incentives for the production of corn ethanol36 and Clean Air

induce electricity consumers to change their consumption patterns, thereby reducing load
peaks and eliminating the need for construction of some peaking plants. See, e.g., PETER FOXPENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF
ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2010).
32. Not only have standards for air emissions from coal-fired power plants grown more
stringent over time, a series of legislative and regulatory developments have extended their
coverage to older, previously grandfathered coal-fired power plants and oil refineries. For a
summary of these developments, see BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 4.
33. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C. ).
34. The Clean Air Act’s permitting standards apply to “new or modified” sources of air
pollution. Id. Therefore, litigation focused on the question of whether plants that predated the
Clean Air Act were nevertheless required to meet the Act’s standards because they had been
“modified” (e.g., after parts were replaced or other upgrades were made). In 2007, the
Supreme Court upheld an EPA interpretation of the word “modified” and effectively extended
the Act’s permitting standards to many older plants. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549
U.S. 561, 562–64 (2007).
35. For a summary of the battle over mercury regulation, see New Jersey v. EPA, 517
F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (overturning the Bush EPA’s mercury rules and recounting their
history), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). On February 6, 2009, the Obama EPA
announced its intention to promulgate mercury rules under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,
including a Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard for coal-fired power
plants. Steven D. Cook, EPA Plans Mercury Rules for Power Plants, Moves to Withdraw
Supreme Court Petition, 40 ENV’T REP. 317 (2009).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 79.1–79.68 (2010) for the EPA’s
regulations on gasoline additives.
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Act requirements mandating the use of additives in gasoline to
reduce tailpipe emissions.37
B. Energy Policy Reform in the Twenty-First Century
Despite all this policy change, in the early twenty-first century
Americans continue to rely heavily on imported oil and dirty, coalfired power. Of the roughly eighty million barrels of oil38 consumed
daily in the world, Americans consume about twenty million
barrels.39 Net imports represent about three-fifths of those twenty
million barrels.40 In the last decade, gasoline prices in the United
States, though volatile, have remained low relative to elsewhere in
the developed world,41 feeding American drivers’ addiction to oil.
Some drivers have turned to ethanol, biodiesel, and electric and
hybrid-electric cars, but the overwhelming majority of American cars
continue to burn gasoline. Likewise, despite its growing regulatory
burden, coal remains the dominant source of electric power in the
United States, constituting about half of our total generating
capacity.42 In percentage terms, renewable sources like wind are
37. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
38. One barrel equals forty-two gallons. General Tables of Units of Measurement, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., http://ts.nist.gov/WeightsAndMeasures/Publications/
appxc.cfm (last updated Apr. 19, 2006).
39. The CIA assembles annual data on oil consumption. See World Factbook, Country
Comparison: Oil – Consumption, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2011).
40. Most American oil imports come from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Middle
East. See BP, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2010, at 20 (2010).
41. Since 2000, gasoline prices in the United States have averaged between $1.50 and
$3.50 a gallon. Because of differentials in delivery costs and state taxes, there has been
considerable variation around those mean prices, but gasoline prices above $4.00 a gallon have
been very rare in the United States. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, RETAIL
GASOLINE HISTORICAL PRICES (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/
data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html. By contrast, prices in excess of $8.00 a gallon
are common in Europe, and have been over the last decade, primarily due to higher energy
taxes in Europe. See Bruce Crumley, Think Gas is High, Try Europe, TIME WORLD (May 28,
2008), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1809900,00.html.
42. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2009,
at 9 (2011), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. Across the
individual American states there is great variety in their generation mixes. Some states rely on
coal for as much as ninety percent of their generating capacity; others have little or no coalfired capacity. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY PRODUCTION
ESTIMATES IN TRILLION BTU, at tbl.P2 (2009), available at http://205.254.135.24/state/
seds/sep_prod/pdf/P2.pdf.
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growing faster than coal-fired generation; however, renewables
started from a very small base. In 2009, renewables (hydro, wind,
solar, and geothermal) constituted more than 10% of American
electric generation, and two-thirds of that 10% was hydroelectric
power.43 In fact, the lion’s share of growth in electric generating
capacity since the 1970s has been taken by natural gas-fired plants,44
which are relatively inexpensive to build, produce fewer pollutants
per unit of energy produced than coal, and have benefited from
advances in turbine design that have driven down costs. They do,
however, emit many of the same pollutants emitted by coal and oil
combustion.45
Increasing dissatisfaction with this pollution was already
provoking renewed calls for comprehensive and fundamental energy
policy reform before two important catalyzing events transformed
those calls into a much louder chorus: (1) the September 11th
attacks (and ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), which triggered
growing concern about the effects of dependence on foreign oil on
energy security and American foreign policy; and (2) the consensus
within the last decade among climatologists that man-made
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are contributing significantly to
global warming,46 a notion that in turn fed public concern about
climate change. The war in Iraq contributed to a worldwide
reduction in the supply of oil (as Iraq’s production dropped from
two million barrels per day to about 1.4 million barrels per day).47
Since September 11th, Americans have become more acutely aware
of their dependence upon oil imported from countries like Saudi
Arabia, from which most of the September 11th hijackers came.
43. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 95, at
tbl.7.2b (2011), available at http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/
mer.pdf.
44. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY NET
GENERATION, at tbl.8.2a, available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/txt/
ptb0802a.html.
45. Clean Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2007).
46. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf
47. See BP, PUTTING ENERGY IN THE SPOTLIGHT: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD
ENERGY 2005, at 6 (2005), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/
globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/publications/energy_reviews_2005/STAGING/local_assets/
downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2005.pdf.
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Thus, September 11th highlighted a long-standing vulnerability, and
in so doing, contributed to public support for greater energy
independence.
Likewise, scientific concern over the effects of anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases is not new. The leading scientific
organization for the study of global warming and climate change,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), was
created more than two decades ago.48 However, within the last
decade the consensus among world’s climatologists that human
activities (primarily, emissions of greenhouse gases49 and
deforestation) are significantly hastening global warming has grown
stronger.50 Global mean temperatures are behaving consistently with
the models produced by climatologists, and we are already
witnessing many of the effects projected by these models, such as
excessive heat, more intense droughts, more severe storms, and the
rapid shrinking of polar ice caps.51 Greenhouse gas concentrations in

48. The IPCC acts as a clearinghouse, aggregator, and evaluator of climate change
research. For more information about its origins and work, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
49. The primary greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
various fluorocarbon compounds. Molecules of these gases tend to trap more solar radiation in
the atmosphere than other air molecules. Among greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide tends to
garner the most attention because its volume in the atmosphere dwarfs that of other
greenhouse gases, even though other gases, such as methane, trap more heat on a moleculeby-molecule basis.
50. In the words of the IPCC, it is “very likely” that human activity is driving climate
change. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 46. Climatologists
have reached this consensus as a result of models that examine factors that influence climate (as
opposed to weather), both natural and man-made. Using data about these potential
determinants of climate change, along with historical climate data, climatologists have found
that models that ascribe significant effects to human activities do the best job of predicting
climate change. For an accessible discussion of the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on
climate, see PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: SCIENCE BRIEF 1 (2008).
51. See Justin Gillis, In Weather Chaos, a Case for Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/science/earth/15climate.html?ref=
temperaturerising (quoting a representative of the National Climactic Data Center suggesting
that these effects are consistent with climate change models); Leslie Kaufman, Scientists’ Report
Stresses Urgency of Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/science/earth/13climate.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
leslie kaufman nation%27 scientific establishment issued a stark&st=cse (describing the
National Research Council’s warning that the risks of inaction on climate change are
profound); Bryan Walsh, Why an Antarctic Glacier Is Melting So Quickly, TIME (June 27,
2011), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2011/06/27/why-an-antarctic-glacier-is-meltingso-quickly/ (summarizing scientific understanding of shrinking polar ice caps).
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the atmosphere have increased from their preindustrial level of 280
parts per million (ppm)52 to their current level of about 390 ppm.53
Because greenhouse gases dissipate slowly in the atmosphere, today’s
emissions will have warming effects for many years to come. Over
the last decade, climatologists and some political leaders have
concluded that managing growth in greenhouse gas emissions to
stabilize concentrations at a level of 450 ppm or lower should
minimize the probability of catastrophic effects.54
The catastrophic effects of global warming and the likelihood
that humans contribute to the harm have fed public desire for
cleaner, more secure sources of energy and kept energy policy reform
on the public agenda over the last decade. The latter years of the
George W. Bush administration produced at least three major energy
bills,55 and the Obama administration pledged that fundamental
energy policy reform would be one of its top policy priorities.56
II. THE LOGIC OF REFORM
A. Objectives and Constraints
We can discern three sets of objectives driving the current wave
of energy policy reform in Congress and the executive branch, as
suggested by Table 1 below. These include (i) environmental
concerns, including the desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
(ii) security concerns, including the desire to reduce dependence
upon imported oil, and (iii) efficiency and reliability concerns,
including the desire to use energy efficiently or to maintain a reliable

52. This number represents a concentration of carbon dioxide or amounts of other
greenhouse gases with equivalent heat trapping capabilities to carbon dioxide.
53. CO2Now.org tracks atmospheric concentrations of CO2. See generally
CO2NOW.ORG, http://www.CO2now.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
54. The 450 ppm number represents an estimate of the maximum atmospheric
concentration that is necessary to keep global mean temperature increases at 2°C or lower.
However, there is considerable disagreement among climatologists and others over the
desirable maximum concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Some analysts argue
that the 450 ppm figure is too high because climate change is taking place considerably faster
than scientists had predicted only a short time ago. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN ET AL., THE
ECONOMICS OF 350: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLIMATE STABILIZATION 9 (2009);
NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at vii
(2006).
55. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
56. See Obama’s Key Promises, WASH. POST, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/special/politics/obamas-promises/ (last updated Jan. 20, 2010).
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energy delivery system. Table 1 also suggests that the primary
constraint preventing legislative action toward these goals is concern
over the costs of action. Can we or should we bear the costs of
reform, such as higher energy prices and higher prices for energyintensive products? Will the benefits exceed the costs? Can we afford
it? Collectively, these questions have been the focus of a great deal of
policy and scholarly attention over the last decade or more. That
attention has produced a great deal of information and analysis
aimed at measuring the costs and benefits of pursuing the objectives
listed on the left side of Table 1.
Table 1: Objectives and Constraints of Energy Policy Reform
Objectives

Constraints

Environmental concerns; e.g.:
 Slow growth in GHG emissions to
reach maximum 450 ppm goal
 Mitigate and adapt to the effects
of climate change
 Reduce emissions of pollutants
(other than CO2) from fossil fuel
combustion

Concern over direct costs (of
energy to businesses and
consumers); e.g.:
 gasoline prices
 electricity prices
 taxes (if reform is revenueneutral to the federal budget)

Security concerns; e.g.:
 Reduce dependence on oil
 Reduce leverage of producing
nations over U.S. policy
 Address security issues associated
with climate change

Concern over indirect costs; e.g.:
 increased price of goods due to
costlier
energy
and
other
resource inputs
 net job losses and other
consequential effects

Efficiency and reliability
concerns; e.g.:
 Reduce consumption of energy
and use energy more efficiently
 Improve reliability and operation
of electric grid
 Reduce price volatility associated
with supply/demand imbalances
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1. Environmental concerns
Among environmental concerns, the lion’s share of attention has
been devoted to the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the
climate. Less attention has been devoted to the other environmental
impacts associated with the use of fossil fuels. Issues like the impacts
of surface coal mining (e.g., on water quality), gasoline-powered
vehicles (e.g., on smog levels), and mercury emissions from coalfired power plants (e.g., on the safety of the food chain) remain
important, but have received far less attention recently, perhaps
because they are familiar, their impacts are more localized, and
regulatory instruments already address those issues. Not so with
greenhouse gas emissions. Assessing the costs and benefits of taking
action to address climate change is an extraordinarily complicated
task, one to which geoscientists and economists have devoted an
enormous amount of attention. That literature is far too large to
summarize fully here, but it is possible to identify some of its key
conclusions and ideological fault lines.
Economists and geoscientists employ a variety of models,
including so-called “integrated assessment models” (IAMs), to
measure the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
These models try to determine the optimal emissions path for
society, taking into consideration a wide variety of characteristics
about the natural carbon cycle, the impacts of human activity on that
cycle, predictions about how natural and human systems will respond
to climate change, and more.57 These models also attempt to
estimate a wide variety of impacts from increasing global
temperatures, including damage to markets (such as changing crop
yields) and property (such as the inundation of land), direct and
indirect costs associated with the reduced availability of fresh water
(such as health effects and relocation costs), damage from more
extreme weather events or sea level rise (such as flooding), lost
ecosystem services, and lost biodiversity. Some of these costs are far
easier to quantify than others. In order to do so, researchers must
sometimes make assumptions about how (and how successfully)
humans and ecosystems will adapt to change. Likewise, estimating
the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires assumptions
57. For a description of integrated assessment models, see MICHAEL D. MASTRANDREA,
CALCULATING THE BENEFITS OF CLIMATE POLICY (2009) and LAWRENCE H. GOULDER &
WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4–13 (2006).
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about how the public and private sectors will pursue this goal. Will
governments mandate emissions reductions? If so, how? Will the
U.S. government impose a tradable permitting system? Will it
impose environmental taxes? There are also questions about how
modelers should discount the future, given that greenhouse gases
remain in the atmosphere for a very long time, and the benefits of
reducing emissions will accrue mostly to future generations while the
current generation will bear the costs.
Different models answer these questions differently, employing
different assumptions and discount rates. Naturally, these different
models have led to varying estimates of the net benefits of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Certainly, the worst case scenarios are
bleak, but there is disagreement over the probability of encountering
the worst case scenario. One 2005 meta-analysis, by Richard Tol,
looked at twenty-eight climate-change IAM studies and attempted to
summarize conclusions they reached. Tol discovered a very large
range of estimates (from negative prices to prices in the hundreds of
dollars per ton of carbon) and concluded that point estimates of
prices were highly sensitive to discount rates and other assumptions.
His “best guess” estimate was only $5 per ton of carbon.58 We can
chalk up some of this variation to the difficulty of predicting how the
climate system will react to temperature increases and how (and how
effectively) humans will react and adapt to physical changes in the
environment. On the other hand, there is much more certainty
about (and much smaller confidence intervals around estimates of)
the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For example, we are
developing better data about the cost of capturing carbon and
storing it, though this technology remains in its infancy.59 We also
now have much more experience with lower-polluting combined
cycle natural gas plants and renewable energy, and we are learning
more about the costs of electric cars and hybrid cars.
Despite the uncertainty, most economic studies of climate
change conclude that the benefits of reducing emissions exceed the
costs. A more recent meta-analysis commissioned by the British

58. Richard S.J. Tol, The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An
Assessment of the Uncertainties, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2064, 2072–73 (2005), available at
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/tol/enpolmargcost.pdf.
59. For an accessible discussion of the cost of carbon capture and storage, see Int’l
Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage, 2006 IEA ENERGY TECH. ESSENTIALS 1, 2,
available at http://www.iea.org/techno/essentials1.pdf.
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government, the so-called “Stern Review,” reaches this conclusion
and argues that recent experience with temperature change implies
that the costs of warming will be far greater than earlier models
anticipated. The Stern Review concludes that:
 The world will be unlikely to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations at the equivalent of 450 ppm of CO; rather, a
concentration in the neighborhood of 500 to 550 ppm is more
likely.
 Stabilizing emissions at the 550 ppm level will cost
approximately one percent of GDP, but it will avoid costs that
are likely to be five to ten times greater than that.60

Tol disputes the Stern Review’s conclusions on a number of
grounds, the most basic being his contention that the Stern Review
underestimates the degree to which developing economies will grow
and be better able to tackle problems that might otherwise be
associated with climate change.61 On the other hand, in May of
2011, the National Research Council issued a report confirming the
validity of climate science and endorsing strong regulatory action on
climate change, concluding that the risks of inaction far outweigh
the risks of action.62
Scholars seem to agree that the impacts of climate change will be
very unevenly distributed, with more costs falling on the developing
nations of the tropics.63 However, many scholars still disagree about
(a) the ability of developing countries to adapt to climate change,
with or without the help of richer countries, and (b) the degree to
which wealthier countries can reduce emissions in sufficient
quantities to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at acceptable
levels. The first issue reflects a widely acknowledged problem with
some of the IAM analyses of climate change; namely, their failure to
account adequately for the effects of human adaptation to climate
change as it occurs. For example, Tol’s critique of the Stern Review
includes the charge that it takes “a rather dim view of human
ingenuity,” and that it underestimates the ability of African countries
60. STERN, supra note 54, at xii fig.3.
61. RICHARD S.J. TOL, THE STERN REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: A COMMENT 2–3 (2006) [hereinafter TOL, THE STERN REVIEW].
62. The NRC is an arm of the National Academy of Sciences. See COMM. ON
AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES, AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES (2011), available at
http://americasclimatechoices.org/.
63. Id.; STERN, supra note 54, at xxi.
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and their wealthier world sponsors to mitigate or avoid many of the
harshest costs associated with climate change.64 Tol is less sanguine
about human ingenuity as applied to the problem of pollution
control, however, arguing that the Stern Review relies upon models
that make “overly optimistic assumptions [about] technological
progress and the costs of emission abatement.”65 For its part, the
Stern Review argues that adaptation is more difficult in developing
countries, where poverty and poor governance hinder collective
action.66
Some analyses suggest that wealthy countries in temperate
climates might even benefit overall from climate change, or at least
that the costs to those countries of reducing emissions far exceed the
benefits (avoided costs). Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein suggest that
it would be more efficient for wealthy countries to make direct
transfer payments to countries who bear the brunt of climate change
costs than for those wealthier countries to try to reduce their
emissions.67 Others dispute these claims.68 However, these claims
raise a particularly difficult aspect of combating climate change: the
requirement of worldwide collective action. As developing countries,
China and India were not obligated to reduce their emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol; now they are two of the largest emitters of
greenhouse gases.69 Some fear that in the absence of emissions
reductions in China and India, the benefits of greenhouse gas
emissions reductions may never be realized.70 Thus, while the weight
of scholarly opinion points toward the need for action to reduce
64. TOL, THE STERN REVIEW, supra note 61, at 2.
65. Id. at 3.
66. STERN, supra note 54, at xxi.
67. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (John M. Olin Law
and Econ., Working Paper No. 354, 2007).
68. Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzmán argue that the United States will not benefit
from climate change and that many analysts underestimate the impacts of climate change on
the United States. Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzmán, Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate
Change and U.S. Interests (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Public Law Research Paper No. 1357690,
2009).
69. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION 10 (2010),
available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf (stating that the largest
five CO2 emitters are China, the United States, the Russian Federation, India, and Japan).
70. Since Kyoto, negotiations over next steps in combating climate change have broken
down repeatedly over the question of whether developing nations like China and India ought
to commit to emissions reductions. They have steadfastly refused to do so, which was a sticking
point at the most recent negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. See John M. Broder,
Many Goals Remain Unmet in Five Nations Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at A1.
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greenhouse gas emissions, that action will require a worldwide
collective effort.
Looking more broadly at the environmental costs of coal-fired
power beyond those associated with climate change, we can ascribe
significant costs and risks to the inhalation of fine particles and the
effects of toxic emissions from coal as well. A 2011 Harvard study
concluded that Americans’ reliance on coal for energy is responsible
for more than 10,000 premature deaths per year, as well as other
health problems.71 It concluded that those costs, if reflected in the
price of electricity, would more than double electricity costs on
average.72 The growing body of evidence of harm associated with our
reliance on coal may explain the Obama administration’s increasing
attention to emissions from coal-fired power plants.
2. Security concerns
Americans’ discomfort with dependence upon foreign sources of
oil dates back at least to the oil shocks of the 1970s. That discomfort
was multiplied by the events of September 11, 2001. Climate change
has added another foreign-policy concern, one tied to our reliance
on fossil fuels generally, not simply those we import from elsewhere.
Quantifying these security and foreign-policy costs to the United
States is at least as difficult as quantifying the social net benefits of
climate change. How do we value the myriad ways in which
dependence on foreign sources of oil affects our foreign-policy
decisions? Certainly the costs of dependence upon foreign sources of
oil are felt acutely by most Americans when the world price of oil
goes up, something Americans have experienced since the oil shocks
of the 1970s.73 In 1973, when OPEC reacted to American support
of Israel in the Yom Kippur war by imposing an oil embargo on the

71. See Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 85 (2011).
72. Id. at 74. For a summary of other studies estimating the external costs of coal, see
External Costs of Coal, SOURCEWATCH.ORG, http://tinyurl.com/42jtbdy (last visited Sept.
28, 2011).
73. YERGIN, supra note 4, at chs. 29, 33 (detailing the American reaction to the oil
crises of 1973 and 1979). On the other hand, price volatility has been a feature of oil markets
since their inception, even in the early years when most American oil was domestically
produced. During the middle and latter part of the 20th century, inexpensive oil from the
Middle East displaced domestic production, much of it from Texas, leading to reduced
production in Texas oil fields. See id. at 92–95, 499–500; see also BRYAN BURROUGH, THE BIG
RICH: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREATEST TEXAS OIL FORTUNES 74–78, 152–54 (2009).
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United States, the extent of American dependence upon foreign
sources of oil became clear. While the energy reforms of the late
1970s were designed in part to reduce that dependence, acceptance
of an integrated world market for oil became a staple of American
policy in the 1980s and 90s.74
Dependence upon foreign oil has shaped American defense
policy and has been a part of defense planning for many decades.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest single
purchaser of oil worldwide,75 consuming several hundred thousand
barrels of oil per day.76 Several recent DoD studies have indicated
that the American military does not see supply interruptions or
shortages as a near-term risk, but it has focused more of its attention
recently on developing alternative fuels, reasoning that doing so
made good long-term strategic sense.77 However, dependence upon
foreign oil affects American security in more important ways; namely,
by influencing foreign-policy decisions, including decisions that lead
to war. For this reason more than any other, the September 11
attacks made integrated world oil markets seem even less acceptable
to many Americans and brought renewed calls for greater energy
independence.78
Increased domestic production may lessen the pain associated
with another oil embargo in the future, and the desire for greater oil
independence seems to be behind the Obama administration’s
decision to support offshore drilling, a decision that was reversed (at
least for the near term) in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon

74. See YERGIN, supra note 4, at chs. 32–36.
75. “Leap Ahead” Technologies and Transformation Initiatives within Defense Science and
Technology Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the
Comm. on Armed Services, 107th Cong. 4–5 (2001) (statement of Hon. Edward C. Aldridge
Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and statement of
Dr. Dolores M. Etter, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering; Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology).
76. Sohbet Karbuz, How Much Energy Does the U.S. Military Consume, DAILY ENERGY
REP., http://tinyurl.com/2g9zzfy (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
77. See Steve Vogel, Pentagon Prioritizes Pursuit of Alternative Fuel Sources, WASH.
POST, Apr. 13, 2009, at A13.
78. See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, ERODING RESPECT FOR
AMERICA NOW SEEN AS A MAJOR PROBLEM: FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES NOW DRIVEN BY
9/11 AND IRAQ 19 (2004) (poll finding seven-in-ten Americans say ensuring adequate energy
supplies should be a top priority and stating the issue has gained “somewhat greater
importance since the mid-1990s, when roughly six-in-ten said this should be a top priority”).
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oil spill.79 However, the Council on Foreign Relations disputes the
notion that domestic production can produce energy independence.
It concluded in 2006 that the American defense policy establishment
needs to let go of the idea that the United States can achieve energy
independence through increased production or stockpiles of oil.80
Rather, as the Council suggested, it seems likely that true energy
independence will require changes in the way we fuel our
transportation fleet.81
Moreover, the impacts of global warming can affect American
foreign policy and security. In developing countries, higher
temperatures may exacerbate water shortages and crop failures,
producing dislocation and other conditions rife for armed conflict. A
group of economists from Stanford, the University of California at
Berkeley, New York University, and Harvard University attempted to
estimate the increased number of war-related deaths in Africa that
would be attributable to global climate change.82 Finding a strong
historical correlation between warfare and temperature increases in
Africa, they conclude that global warming will increase armed
conflict in Africa (a continent from which the United States imports
significant quantities of oil) by fifty-four percent, leading to nearly
400,000 additional warfare related deaths by 2030.83 In 2004, a
Pentagon analysis anticipated catastrophic resource shortages and an
increased probability of warfare and other forms of conflict as a result
of global warming.84 Another report by the CNA Corporation found
that “projected climate change poses a serious threat to America’s
national security,” and that it has the “potential to create sustained
natural and humanitarian disasters on a scale far beyond those we see
79. In announcing his rationale for the decision, President Obama said, “There will be .
. . those who say we should not open any new areas to drilling. But . . . this announcement is
part of a broader strategy that will move us from an economy that runs on fossil fuels and
foreign oil to one that relies more on homegrown fuels and clean energy.” President Barack
Obama, White House, Remarks on Energy Security at Andrews Air Force Base (Mar. 31,
2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/yfwdytc.
80. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO.
58, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY 35 (2006).
81. See id. at 37–38.
82. Marshall B. Burke et al., Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War in Africa, 106
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20,670 (2009).
83. Id. at 20,672.
84. This classified report was leaked to a British newspaper, The Observer. Mark
Townsend & Paul Harris, Now the Pentagon Tells Bush: Climate Change Will Destroy Us, THE
OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 2004, at 3.
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today . . . .”85 The report predicts that the changes wrought by
global warming will produce conditions that are rife for extremism,
conflict, authoritarianism, and radical ideologies.86 It recommends
that the United States take a “stronger national and international
role to help stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid
significant disruption of global security and stability.”87
None of these analyses place a dollar value on the national
security threats associated with dependency on foreign oil or climate
change. We can infer, however, that conclusions like those reached
by the CNA Corporation reflect an implicit conclusion that the
benefits associated with combating climate change exceed the costs.
B. Conservation and Efficiency
The logic of conservation and efficiency is simple. It is not oil or
gas or electricity that we really want: rather, it is the services that
they provide. If we can obtain those same services while using less
oil, gas, or electricity, we can (i) save money, (ii) reduce the
environmental impacts associated with exploiting those energy
sources, and (iii) reduce our dependence upon foreign energy
sources. Because we can save money by using energy more
efficiently, many of the gains associated with maximizing energy
efficiency are already being realized. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, the energy intensity of the American
economy (measured in year 2000 dollars) declined from $17.34 per
BTU in 1949 to $7.28 per BTU in 2009.88 Businesses, in particular,
have better exploited energy efficiency opportunities since the energy
crises of the 1970s.89
But there remain additional unrealized opportunities as well. The
American economy generates more output per capita than other
economies, but per capita energy consumption in the United States
remains very high—nearly double that of the average Western

85. THE CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
44–45 (2007).
86. Id. at 44.
87. Id. at 7.
88. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009
(2010), available at http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.
89. See Energy Innovation, Efficiency Can Help Small Businesses Prosper,
BUSINESSNEWSDAILY, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/national-energyregulation-small-business-support-1814/.
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European.90 Some analysts believe that energy efficiency holds great
promise in the effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Princeton
professors Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala suggest an approach
to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations that focuses on socalled “stabilization wedges.”91 These wedges represent individual
steps (of roughly equal effect on carbon emissions) that society can
take to reduce growth in the rate of greenhouse gas emissions, such
as improving the efficiency of household energy consumption,
implementing changes in the transportation sector’s energy usage,
and increasing reliance on renewable energy.92 Nearly half of the
possible reductions Socolow and Pacala identify can be realized
through various forms of conservation or efficiency. Many of these
wedges are also among the more cost-effective approaches to
combating climate change.
A recent study by the consulting firm McKinsey and Co. echoed
the conclusions of Socolow and Pacala. McKinsey predicted that
energy efficiency investments could yield a 23% reduction in energy
demand in the United States and benefits that more than double the
costs.93 The problem, argued McKinsey, is that the various energy-

90. In 2006, United States per capita consumption of primary energy was 334.6 million
Btu, compared to 146.2 million Btu per capita in Europe. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T
OF ENERGY, WORLD PER CAPITA TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1980–2006
(2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/energyconsumption.html
(open the Excel document for “Most Countries” under “Per Capita (Per Person) Total
Primary Energy Consumption (Million Btu per Person).”) In 2007, estimates for electricity
consumption as “kWh/capita” show that U.S. individual demand (13616 kWh) greatly
exceeds demand in Germany (7185 kWh), Spain (6296 kWh), and the United Kingdom (6142
kWh). INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 48–57 (2009), available at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf.
91. Robert Socolow & Stephen Pacala, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968 (2004).
92. Id. at 969–71. For a detailed description of the various energy efficiency law and
policy improvements that might comprise these various wedges, see John Dernbach,
Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency
and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REV. 10,003 (2007).
93. HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE US ECONOMY, at iv (2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/
Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinking/~/media/McKinsey/dotc
om/client_service/EPNG/PDFs/Unlocking%20energy%20efficiency/US_energy_efficiency_f
ull_report.ashx. See also David Hodas, Imagining the Unimaginable: Reducing U.S. Greenhouse
Gas Emissions by Forty Percent, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271 (2008) (making the case for larger
productions); Michael Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 715 (2011) (detailing the literature on behavioral impediments to energy efficiency
investments).
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saving opportunities in the U.S. economy are fragmented, spread
across “more than 100 million locations and billions of devices,”
making coordinated solutions difficult.94 Thus, part of the problem is
that many of the remaining unrealized energy efficiency
opportunities can be realized only by individuals, not businesses.
They are attached to individual consumers’ decisions, such as
purchasing relatively energy-inefficient homes, cars, and appliances,
for example. Economist Stephen DeCanio calls this tendency of
consumers to miss opportunities to save money through energy
efficiency “the energy efficiency paradox.”95
Some scholars ascribe these unrealized opportunities to
behavioral heuristics that prevent people from recognizing the
opportunities posed by efficiency investments, and they suggest that
the problem is one of “norm activation.”96 John Dernbach argues
that people pass up opportunities to save energy and money because
the issue of energy efficiency is not sufficiently salient to them.97 Part
of the salience of the problem is the “out of sight, out of mind”
problem: if people are made more aware of the energy they are using
to perform tasks, they will improve their energy efficiency.
The other part of the salience issue is the effect of social norms:
generally speaking, people wish to conform to social norms and
expectations. They lack information about the energy they are using,
about opportunities to save money by using less energy, and
(perhaps most importantly) about how much energy their peers are
using.98 Dernbach argues that governments and private standardsetting organizations can activate norms of energy efficiency by
ensuring that consumers understand national and local energy
efficiency goals and have access to information about their (and their
peers’) energy usage.99

94. GRANADE ET AL., supra note 93, at viii.
95. Stephen J. DeCanio, The Efficiency Paradox: Bureaucratic and Organizational
Barriers to Profitable Energy-Saving Investments, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 441, 441 (1998).
96. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCI.
1204 (2010) (summarizing some of the literature on new norms and energy consumption, and
suggesting ways to activate norms of conservation and efficiency investment); John C.
Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater US Energy Consumption, 20 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15 (2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C.
Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007).
97. Dernbach, supra note 92, at 10,028–31.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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1. Translating objectives into policies
a. Policy instruments. There is no shortage of reasons to pursue
fundamental energy policy reform. However, in its barest form, the
logic of reform ignores distributional issues. That is, energy policy
reform may yield positive net benefits to the world, but the world is
not a unitary actor. Real action will be taken by a combination of
government and private sector actors, both individual and collective.
In China, if the government wishes to shift from coal-fired power to
hydroelectric or nuclear power, it can do so by making a unilateral
decision to build more hydroelectric plants and fewer coal-fired
plants, because, in China, the energy sector is mostly in government
hands. The U.S. government cannot simply throttle up or throttle
down greenhouse gas emissions, oil imports, or efficiency in
consumption. Rather, because most investment in energy production
and distribution is undertaken by the private sector, the U.S.
government must rely on law and regulation to steer private
investment in favored directions. It must use policy mandates or
incentives to influence private sector action.
Consequently, for government the true choice variables in the
pursuit of energy policy reform are the regulatory instruments it
employs to induce changes in production and consumption patterns.
Table 2, below, organizes the relevant regulatory instruments into
their essential categories. We can think of the energy sector as
divided along two dimensions: the first distinguishes production
from consumption, and the second distinguishes the transportation
sector from the stationary (home or business) energy-use sector. For
example, we can focus on producers of greenhouse gas emissions,
like vehicles and stationary sources. We can tax their emissions, or
impose a so-called “cap and trade” or “tradable permit” system that
would auction or distribute progressively fewer marketable permits
(rights to emit GHGs) to emitters over time. Or we can focus on
consumers of energy by (i) mandating that they either purchase less
energy (by way of mandatory efficiency standards for vehicles,
appliances, and buildings) or energy from less polluting sources (as
would a national RPS for electricity), (ii) subsidizing their purchases
of clean fuels and technologies, and/or (iii) requiring investment in
smart grid technology so as to enhance electric grid reliability.
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Table 2: Selected Regulatory Instruments (Choice Variables) for Energy Policy
Reform

Production &
Distribution
of Energy

Transportation

Home/Business

GHG emissions
standards for vehicles.
Likely alternative vehicle
technologies:
 Ethanol (corn;
cellulosic)
 Biodiesel
 Electric vehicles
(EVs), hybrid
electrics, and plug-in
hybrid electrics
(PHEVs)
 Natural gas

National RPS Technologies:
 Wind
 Solar
 Biomass
 Hydro (including tidal and
wave energy)
 Geothermal
 Waste-to-energy
(municipal solid waste,
landfill gas, etc.)
 Other

Carbon (Gasoline) Tax

Subsidies for preferred
technologies (e.g., renewables,
nuclear power, etc.)

Subsidies for
manufacture of preferred
technologies (production
of alternatively fueled
vehicles, mass transit, etc.)

Mandatory smart grid
investments by utilities
 Grid improvements
 Smart meters
 Demand response tariffs
GHG emissions reduction:
 GHG standards under the
CAA (including carbon
capture and sequestration)
 Marketable permit
system (cap and trade)
 Carbon tax

Consumption
of Energy

Purchase incentives
(rebates, tax credits or
deductions) for alternative
fueled-vehicles (biofuels,
EVs, PHEVs, hybrids)

Mandatory smart grid
investments by utilities (e.g.
smart meters)

More stringent CAFE
standards (fuel efficiency)

Appliance efficiency standards

Building codes

Subsidies for purchase of
efficient buildings and appliances,
distributed (renewable)
generation, etc.
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b. Recent steps toward reform. Within the last few years, regulators
and legislators have begun to experiment with some of the
regulatory instruments listed in Table 2. In 2005, the Bush
administration issued more stringent CAFE standards for SUVs and
light trucks.100 However, environmental groups challenged these
standards as insufficiently stringent, and they were overturned by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007.101 Between 2005 and 2008,
Congress passed (and the President signed) three energy bills. On
each of these occasions, proponents of greenhouse gas emissions
regulation and strong federal action to mandate increased use of
renewables came away disappointed. However, these three statutes—
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005),102 the Energy
Information and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),103 and the Energy
Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (EIEA),104 along with the
inclusion of some energy provisions in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),105 did establish some important
incentives for movement away from fossil fuels and toward more
secure, cleaner technologies and fuels.
What did these federal laws do? For the most part, they created
new or extended financial incentives such as loan guarantees and tax
credits for (i) the production and consumption of renewable and
other domestic sources of energy, (ii) greater efficiency in
consumption, and (iii) investments in energy security and reliability.
The EPAct 2005 focused on energy security over environmental
objectives, creating powerful new financial incentives to jumpstart
the moribund American nuclear power industry106 and allocating

100. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years 2008-2011, 71
Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537).
101. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508
(9th Cir. 2007), vacated and withdrawn, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
102. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
103. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat.
1492 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 15, 29, 42, 46, and 49 U.S.C.).
104. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3808 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
105. American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
116 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
106. Most importantly, the statute extended insurance guarantees contained in the Price
Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act through 2025 and added additional loan
guarantees, a production tax credit, and additional financial protections for cost overruns and
delays. Energy Policy Act of 2005 tit. VI. Some of these provisions apply only to the first six
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large sums of money in the form of tax benefits for domestic fossil
fuel production as well as renewables and efficiency.107 On the other
hand, the statute did mandate increases in the use of ethanol as a
gasoline additive to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012.108 This mandate was
strengthened two years later with the passage of EISA, which
established a target of 36 billion gallons by 2022.109 This statute,
along with EIEA, focused more directly on efficiency and
renewables, strengthening and extending some of the financial
incentives found in EPAct 2005,110 repealing some existing subsidies
for oil and gas development,111 and imposing new efficiency
standards for appliances.112 The 2009 stimulus bill, ARRA, added
money to the pot for efficiency,113 alternative fuels,114 and
infrastructure development.115
Perhaps the two most important products of this barrage of
legislation were (i) the long-term extension of the production tax
credit for renewables116 and (ii) strengthened CAFE standards for
automobiles. Since their inception in the late 1970s, tax credits for

new nuclear power plants licensed and built after passage of the statute. Id. § 638(b).
107. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & NATURAL RES., IMPACTS OF THE ENERGY POLICY
ACT OF 2005, available at http://tinyurl.com/3qlctwk.
108. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1501. As an additive to gasoline for standard engines,
ethanol comprises ten percent of the fuel mix, a mix that would be denoted “E-10.” This
provision of the EPAct 2005 did not apply to higher mixes of ethanol, id., such as E-85, which
cannot be burned in standard engines, and requires special or modified engines. In some parts
of the country, such as the upper Midwest, use of E-85 is not uncommon.
109. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202, 121
Stat. 1492, 1521 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)).
110. Id. § 231 (extending and increasing EPAct 2005 funds for “bioenergy” research).
111. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1502 (amending I.R.C. § 167(h)(5) to prolong the
amortization of geological and geophysical expenditures for certain major integrated oil
companies); An Act of Oct. 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Division B—Energy Improvement
and Extension Act of 2008. §§ 401–402, 122 Stat. 3807, 3851–54 (amending revenue
provisions for oil and gas industry on domestic production deduction and foreign tax credit).
112. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 §§ 301–308 (efficiency standards
for appliances and lighting).
113. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Division A–
Appropriations Provision, tit. IV, 123 Stat. 116, 467–96 (appropriating an additional $16.8
billion for ‘‘Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy” to the Department of Energy).
114. Id. § 1123 (amending I.R.C. § 30C to create a temporary credit for “alternative fuel
vehicle refueling property”).
115. Id. at div. A, tit. XII (appropriating an additional $27.5 billion for “Highway
Infrastructure Investment” to the Federal Highway Administration).
116. Id. § 1101 (extending the “Credit for Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable
Sources” at I.R.C. § 45).
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renewable electricity-generating facilities were renewed by Congress
sporadically, one or two years at a time.117 Because some renewable
technologies depend on the credit to remain cost competitive, the
inability to depend on that subsidy (about two cents per kilowatt
hour for the production tax credit)118 made it difficult for sponsors of
wind, solar, and other renewable facilities to plan and invest. After
extending the production credit briefly under EIEA,119 Congress
extended the credit to 2014 for certain renewable technologies and
to 2011 for wind and solar in ARRA.120 As for CAFE standards,
EISA raised standards for automobiles from the current 27.5 mpg
for cars and 20.7 for SUVs and light trucks to 35 mpg for the entire
fleet by 2020, a significant increase.121
However, as during the early years of the environmental
movement in the 1960s, these early steps toward energy policy
reform by the federal government have been cautious and measured,
and it was left to states to experiment with bolder action. Proponents
of strong action called for limits on emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases (which have not traditionally been regulated
under the Clean Air Act) from automobiles and stationary sources, a
national RPS for electricity, and standards mandating more efficient
consumption, including appliance standards, changes to building
codes, and even more stringent CAFE standards. Many such
proposals were introduced in Congress during the first Bush
administration;122 however, because they lacked the support of both
117. See supra note 14.
118. I.R.S. Form 8835, Renewable Electricity, Refined Coal, and Indian Coal
Production Credit (OMB No. 1545-1362) (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8835.pdf.
119. An Act of Oct. 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Division B—Energy Improvement
and Extension Act of 2008 § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3807, 3808 (extending, inter alia, the
I.R.C. § 45 credit for wind facilities through January 1, 2010).
120. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1101 (extending the “Credit for
Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources” at I.R.C. § 45).
121. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102(b)(2),
121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2006)).
122. Bills proposing carbon dioxide regulation during the Bush Administration include
the Clean Power Act of 2002, S. 556, 107th Cong. (2002); The Clean Power Plant and
Modernization Act of 2001, S. 1131, 107th Cong. (2001); The Clean Air Planning Act of
2002, S. 3135, 107th Cong. (2002); Clean Smokestacks Act of 2003, H.R. 2042, 108th
Cong. (2003); and Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong.
(2005). See also H.R. 5756, 107th Cong. (2002) (seeking to establish a national RPS);
Automobile Fuel Economy Act of 2001, S. 804, 107th Cong. (2001);. These are just a sample
of a much larger set of at least twenty-five bills addressing these issues. Several of those bills
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the President and the Republican majority, none of those bills were
enacted into law.
By comparison, state regulators have taken a much more direct
approach to the problem of global warming and climate change in
the last five years. For example, in 2006, California enacted AB 32, a
law establishing a statewide program of greenhouse gas emission
regulation that aims to reduce emissions in the state to 1990 levels
by the year 2020.123 Using its unique power to establish independent
automotive standards under the Clean Air Act,124 in 2005 the State
of California sought EPA permission to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from vehicles.125 That same year, a group of Northeastern
states formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a
cooperative effort to regulate greenhouse gases within their borders
using a marketable permit system,126 not unlike the one already in
place in the European Union.127 Under the RGGI program, most
marketable permits (called “emissions allowances”) are auctioned off
to emitters, and the proceeds are invested in energy efficiency,
renewable energy, and other clean energy technologies. This marks a

had bipartisan support, including one sponsored by 2008 Republican presidential nominee,
John McCain. See Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, H.R. 759, 109th Cong. (2005).
123. This law has proven controversial, surviving a recall petition and a judicial challenge
brought by environmental justice advocates challenging the cap-and-trade portions of the bill.
See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-5059562 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar.
18, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/51242057/AIR-v-CARB.
124. California is the only state authorized to establish its own standards for automobiles.
The other forty-nine states may choose to apply either the federal standards or the California
standards.
125. California’s petition to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars was rejected by
the (Bush) EPA on the grounds that carbon dioxide is not a “pollutant” under the Clean Air
Act. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court determined that EPA does have the power to
regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. 549 U.S. 497 (2006). In July
of 2009, the (Obama) EPA reversed its position and granted California permission to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from cars. Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act
Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32, 744 (July 8, 2009).
126. Under RGGI, participating states are seeking a ten percent reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions from within their borders by 2019. Memorandum from the New England
Power Generators Association, Inc. to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Working Group
1 (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/nepga.pdf.
127. For more on the European Union’s carbon trading scheme, see A. Danny Ellerman
& Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation,
and Early Results, REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y, Winter 2007, at 66, available at
http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/66.full.pdf+html.
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contrast with the acid rain program, in which most pollution rights
are distributed to emitters free of charge based on past emissions.128
However, state regulation is not a substitute for coordinated
federal efforts; recent initiatives seem only to tinker around the edges
of energy policy. The modest nature of these recent policy changes is
reflected in the United States Energy Information Administration’s
(EIA) 2010 projections for the United States’ energy future. While
the EIA projects rapid growth in renewables, it also foresees
continued dominance of fossil fuels through 2035. Fossil fuel
consumption as a percentage of total consumption of energy liquids
will decline from 84% to 78% (due to increased use of biofuels in
transportation), and the total amount of liquid fossil fuels Americans
consume will remain relatively steady.129 This means that Americans
will continue to rely heavily on imported oil, with all of the foreignpolicy complications that reliance entails. Likewise, the EIA projects
an increase in the use of coal-fired electricity generation in the next
twenty-five years.130 If these projections hold true, the United States
will continue to emit more greenhouse gases per capita than most
other countries, making the possibility of achieving stable
greenhouse gas concentrations at or below the 450 ppm level very
remote.131
Most of the regulatory instruments listed in Table 2 are coercive
in nature, designed to force, rather than encourage, change.
Mandatory greenhouse gas emissions limits for automobiles and
stationary sources, for example, would force fundamental change in
the production of automobiles and the way we generate electricity in
the United States. More stringent CAFE standards would force
manufacturers to produce, and consumers to buy, smaller, lighter
vehicles. A national renewable portfolio standard for electricity
generation would force electric utilities to acquire renewable
electricity (or renewable energy credits representing the generation
of renewable electricity), rather than merely encourage its
128. The European Union’s carbon trading scheme also distributes its pollution rights
free of charge, for the most part. Id. at 73.
129. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2010: EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 6 (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/
oiaf/aeo/pdf/overview.pdf.
130. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383 ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 79 (2010), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/
documents/DWP_--_Annual_Energy_Outlook_2010_%28with_ projections_to_2035%29.pdf.
131. STERN, supra note 54, at 201.
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production. Whereas Bush administration energy legislation offered
more carrots than sticks,132 the national elections of 2008 brought
calls for stronger federal action aimed at curbing greenhouse gas
emissions and promoting efficiency and renewables.
Reflecting this preference for stronger regulation, the Obama
administration (the “Administration”) has initiated the process of
regulating carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles and stationary
sources under the Clean Air Act133 and is further strengthening rules
governing emissions of conventional and toxic pollutants from coalfired power plants.134 In July 2011, the Administration announced a
plan to drastically tighten CAFE standards further to 54.5 miles a
gallon between 2017 and 2025.135 Once these more efficient
automobiles have fully penetrated the market, these new CAFE
standards will reduce American oil consumption by more than ten
132. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b.
133. The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), paved
the way for regulation of carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act, though several interest
groups have indicated that they are likely to challenge the EPA’s efforts in court. The EPA has
acknowledged that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions through new legislation is
preferable to administrative action but is pressing forward with its plans to regulate. See
Limitation of Approval of Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions Concerning
Greenhouse Gas Emitting-Sources in State Implementation Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,536 (Dec.
30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (establishing rules for permitting GHG
emissions for major new sources); Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Finding of Failure to Submit State Implementation Plan Revisions Required for Greenhouse
Gases, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,874 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (establishing
EPA process for reviewing GHG emissions impacts in permit renewals); see also John M.
Broder, E.P.A. Expected to Regulate Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A15,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/science/earth/19epa.html?
pagewanted=all.
134. The EPA’s “Cross-State Air Pollution Rule,” finalized in the summer of 2011,
targets emissions of ozone precursors and fine particulates from power plants. Federal
Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and
Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97). A few months before, the EPA had proposed new rules governing
the emissions of mercury and other toxic pollutants from fossil-fueled power plants. See
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric
Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional
Steam Generating Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011).
135. Sharon Terlep, High Test: 54.5 MPG Cars Promise to Arrive by 2025, WALL ST. J.,
July 28, 2011, at B.1. An earlier 2009 plan had sought more modest goals. The White House
Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy, THE
WHITE HOUSE (May 19, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/presidentobama-announces-national-fuel-efficiency-policy/.
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percent (2.2 million barrels per day).136 Indeed, the Union of
Concerned Scientists believes these standards could reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by more than 10%.137 In 2009, the
Administration proposed limits on greenhouse gas emissions from
stationary sources as well,138 and the Department of Energy has
continued to seek improved appliance efficiency standards.139
Energy bills introduced by the Democratic majority during the
111th Congress represented by far the most comprehensive and
fundamental attempt at regulatory reform in quite some time. In the
summer of 2009, the House of Representatives passed House Bill
2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also
known as the “Waxman–Markey” bill.140 Among other things, the
bill
 established a national RPS effective in 2012 (with an
ultimate goal of requiring utilities to secure 20% of their
electricity from renewable sources by the year 2020),141
 required the EPA Administrator to promulgate
regulations creating a marketable permit system for GHG
emissions effective in 2012 (with an ultimate goal of
reducing emissions to 17% of 2005 levels by the year
2050),142
 required a 65% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions
from electric generating units by 2020,143
 authorized the EPA Administrator to establish GHG
emissions standards for new heavy-duty vehicles,144 and

136. Driving Efficiency: Cutting Costs for Families at the Pump and Slashing Dependence
on Oil, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://tinyurl.com/3opytg3 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
137. That is, by about 190 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, as against
annual emissions of just over one billion metric tons. Press Release, Union of Concerned
Scientists, House Energy Bill Analysis (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://
www.commondreams.org/news2007/1205-23.htm.
138. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
74 Fed. Reg. 57,126 (Nov. 4, 2009).
139. Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary Chu Announces More Stringent
Standards for Home Water Heaters and Other Heating Products (Apr. 1, 2010), available at
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/news_detail.cfm/news_id=17429.
140. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). The named sponsors are Congressman Henry
Waxman of California and Congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts.
141. Id. § 101(d)(1)–(2).
142. Id. § 311.
143. Id. § 116.
144. Id. § 821.
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 authorized the Secretary of Energy to establish national
building code energy efficiency targets and to oversee a
program of peak demand reduction for electric utilities.145
For its part, the Senate took no final action on energy legislation in
the 111th Congress. The bill that garnered the most attention was
Senate Bill 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act,
also known as the “Kerry-Boxer” bill.146 Kerry-Boxer was never
reported out of committee in the Senate, and the Waxman-Markey
bill (which passed narrowly in the House) was pronounced dead on
arrival in the Senate by various commentators.147 During the spring
of 2010, a bipartisan group of three senators—known as the “Gang
of Three”—worked to reconfigure the bill so as to increase its
chances of Senate passage.148 However, even that resuscitation effort
seemed to fail when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced
in August 2010 that he had abandoned efforts to pass a
comprehensive bill in the Senate.149 Comprehensive energy
legislation has not been pursued in any serious way by the 112th
Congress, perhaps reflecting majority opposition in the Republicancontrolled House of Representatives.
III. THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ENERGY POLICY REFORM
If the benefits of energy policy reform exceed the costs, as many
seem to believe, why has fundamental reform eluded the
government’s grasp so far? Have voters failed to recognize the

145. Id. § 201.
146. S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009). The named sponsors are Senator John Kerry of
Massachusetts and Senator Barbara Boxer of California. Kerry-Boxer would impose many of
the same new requirements as Waxman-Markey, with a few differences. For example, it did not
contain a national RPS.
147. Harry Fuller, Repubs Say the Waxman-Markey Bill Is DOA in Senate, GreenTech
Pastures, ZDNET (June 28, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/green/repubssay-the-waxman-markey-bill-is-doa-in-senate/5667.
148. Those senators were Republican Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, Independent
Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, and Democrat John Kerry of Massachusetts. Joe Walsh, Kerry
and Graham Renew Bipartisan Energy on Climate Bill, RED GREEN AND BLUE (Jan. 26,
2010), http://tinyurl.com/yb2br85.
149. On August 2, 2010, Reid abandoned an effort to pass a watered-down bill that
would have addressed energy efficiency and various issues associated with the Deepwater
Horizon disaster, but which omitted provisions curbing greenhouse gas emissions or
establishing a national RPS. David M. Herzehorn, Energy Bill a No Go in the Senate, The
Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, 7:39 PM, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/08/03/energy-bill-a-no-go-in-the-senate/?partner=rss&emc=rss.
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benefits of reform? Has Congress failed to translate voter preferences
into policy decisions? Has it instead responded to powerful business
interests at the expense of the public?
A. The Logic of Legislative Action
Political science literature offers some insight into these
questions. Like legal scholarship, political science has been affected
profoundly by the debate between economists’ rational actor model
of human behavior and competing models arising out of behavioral
and evolutionary psychology. Both perspectives have something to
say about the politics of energy reform, and together they suggest an
explanation for Congress’s inability to enact comprehensive energy
policy reform to date.
It is commonplace in rational actor analyses of congressional
behavior to begin with two generally accepted premises. The first is
that members of Congress are motivated by a mixture of goals, but
the desire to be reelected is preeminent among them.150 Thus,
legislators may seek particular policy goals, prestige, career
advancement within the institution, etc.; however, in order to
accomplish any of these goals, a legislator must remain in office.151
The second premise is that voters are rationally ignorant; that is, they
remain relatively uninformed about most policy decisions.152 It is
rational for voters to be relatively less informed about policy choices
because they lack the time, resources, and (sometimes) inclination to
become fully informed. Therefore, they delegate the process of
making informed decisions to their elected representatives. If
legislators act as good Burkean trustees,153 the legislature ought to

150. This is the working assumption of most Congressional scholars in political science.
See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004)
(often credited as the best argument for this working assumption).
151. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 137
(1978).
152. Economist Anthony Downs popularized this notion. See generally ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
153. The British philosopher Edmund Burke is credited with first articulating this model
of representation: namely, the elected representative as trustee making decisions on behalf of
constituents, rather than acting on their specific instructions. Edmund Burke, Speech at the
Conclusion of the Poll 3 November 1774, in 3 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND
BURKE 63, 68–70 (W. M. Elofson with John A. Woods eds., 1996).
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produce decisions that reflect the wishes of the fully informed
median voter.154
From these two propositions we can deduce some important
conclusions about how individual legislators make policy choices.
The first conclusion is obvious: if a legislator’s first goal is reelection,
then calculations of the electoral risk associated with different courses
of action will drive the initial stages of the legislator’s decision
making process. Political scientists distinguish between the
legislator’s “geographical constituency” and her “reelection
constituency,”155 and it is the latter to which the legislator must
attend to preserve her job.156
At the same time, rational ignorance complicates the legislator’s
choice. Legislators know that voters do not care about all issues
equally. Therefore, for each policy choice a legislator faces, including
questions of energy policy reform, she must try to anticipate the
electoral risk of her action alternatives.157 That calculation, in turn,
will depend upon several factors:
 The electoral vulnerability of the legislator (the safety of
the legislator’s seat and the reservoir of trust, or
“leeway,”158 the legislator has developed among her
reelection constituency).
154. That is, if we assume that preferences over policy alternatives can be represented as
points distributed along a single dimension (i.e., points on a line), some voters (and legislators)
will have preferences, represented by points in either tail of the distribution, while others will
have preferences represented by points near the center or middle of the distribution. One
voter’s preference will be represented by the median point in the distribution. We call this
person the median voter. To suggest that the legislative choice should reflect the preferences of
the fully informed median voter is to propose an economic description of the Burkean concept
of representation. See FENNO, supra note 151.
155. FENNO, supra note 151, at 8; see also, GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 63–64 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the central task of
congressional candidates: namely, to decide which parts of a heterogeneous constituency to
write off, which to court, and how to reach the latter group).
156. This is because constituents will base their voting decisions in part on their
retrospective evaluations of candidates’ performance in office. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE
LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); WILLIAM T. BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES
AND CONSTITUENTS (1994); MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
157. Arnold notes that a vote can rouse the “attentive public,” a risk to which legislators
must constantly attend. ARNOLD, supra note 156, at 64–68.
158. If the legislator enjoys the support of a very large majority of her constituents, she
may have “leeway” to vote against their interests or preferences. That reserve of leeway can
dwindle if she does so too often. BIANCO, supra note 156, at 79–80.
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 The legislator’s perception of how salient the issue is to
voters—i.e., how much voters know about the issue, and
how likely it is that voters will become aware of the
legislator’s choice.159
 The legislator’s perception of voters’ preference intensity—
i.e., the importance of the issue to voters relative to other
issues on which the legislator has taken a position.
 The traceability of the consequences of the vote, both
negative (the risk of blame) and positive (the ability to
claim credit),160 which in turn is partly a function of the
issue’s salience and other factors.
Thus, if the legislator faces no electoral risk of any kind—
because her seat is safe, and/or few if any constituents care about the
issue now or are likely to care later—the legislator is free to vote as
she wishes without electoral consequence. At the other extreme,
when electoral risk is high—because the issue is highly salient or
important to all voters, and the legislator’s seat is not safe—the
legislator’s choice should reflect the preferences of the median voter
in her constituency.161 For example, Figure 1 depicts two possible
distributions of constituent preferences: one approximates a normal
distribution, and the other is bimodal.162 In both of these two
hypothetical examples, the median voter’s (MV) position is the same;
159. The term “salient” is sometimes used in ways that conflate the notions of voter
awareness and preference intensity, as in the sentence “Abortion policy is highly salient to
right-to-life organizations.” I will use the term to refer to the level of current or likely future
voter awareness of an issue or policy choice. I use the term “preference intensity” to refer to
the issue of how much voters care about the issue.
160. See ARNOLD, supra note 156, at 47; FENNO, supra note 151, at 141–46.
161. In the linear model of voter position discussed earlier, supra note 154, and
represented in Figure 1, we are assuming that each individual voter and each politician has a
utility distribution that is at its highest point at the voter’s/politician’s ideal policy choice (her
ideal point), and that individual utility over other choices falls as the distance between the
individual’s ideal point in the policy choice grows. In the parlance of spatial modeling, we
assume that individual preferences here are “single peaked”; collective preferences need not be
single-peaked in order for the collective (in this case, say, a legislature) to make a rational
choice. See supra text accompanying notes 153–154; infra Figure 1.
162. This figure depicts the distribution of voters corresponding to preferences at each
point on the line. Thus, collective preferences need not be single-peaked. In this depiction, we
inferred that the legislator chooses the median voter’s ideal point in order to maximize her
chances of reelection.
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we might assume in this simple example that the legislator (L)
seeking reelection will be motivated to adopt the median voter’s
position.
Figure 1: Two Potential Distributions of Voter Opinion in a
Hypothetical Legislative District

MV

However, in between these two extremes lies the far more
interesting and common situation in which the legislator faces some
electoral risk because the issue is salient and important to some
voters but not others, and/or because some voters might become
unhappy with the legislator’s choice later (“traceability”). In these
situations, legislators might pursue their electoral goals by choosing
policies that serve the interests of an attentive minority for whom the
issue is particularly salient or important, at the expense of the
remaining
constituents’
(and
the
median
constituent’s)
preferences.163 Figure 2 depicts situations like this. In Figure 2, the
shaded portions of the diagram represent voters to whom the policy
issue at stake is more salient or more important; we might call these
voters “high demanders” on this issue. Presumably, these high
demanders are more likely to base their votes for or against the
legislator at the next election on how the legislator votes on this
policy issue in Congress. In that situation, it is rational for the
legislator to move to a position that lies somewhere within the
shaded portion of the diagram.

163. ARNOLD, supra note 156, at 82–87.
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Figure 2: Legislator’s Choice When Salience and/or
Preference Intensity Differs Among Voters

MV
MV
LL

MV
L

Social scientists have long argued that the wealthy and business
groups benefit from this phenomenon, exerting disproportionate
influence over the policy process. Speaking long ago about the role
of interest group pressure in the policy process, political scientist
E.E. Schattschneider said, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that
the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably
about 90 per cent of the people cannot get into the pressure
system.”164 Economist Mancur Olson offered a logical explanation
for this perception, arguing that small, organized groups face fewer
transaction costs when organizing and have more to gain from
organizing to pressure government;165 hence, they will have an easier
164. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960).
165. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 141–46 (Schocken Books 1968) (1965). Olson’s work gave birth to
a huge literature that conceptualized interest group activity and the regulatory process as a
prisoner’s dilemma game, one in which members of groups representing diffuse interests have
much more of a temptation to free ride than members of groups representing tightly organized
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time being heard by government officials.166 When legislators attend
to the interests of these highly motivated, better informed
minorities, Congress can produce decisions that deviate from
majority opinion or from the fully informed preferences of the
median voter.
Figure 3 depicts one way in which the presence of high
demanders can alter legislative choice. Assume in this legislature that
there are seven members: four belong to the Left Party, and three to
the Right Party. Imagine that each legislator’s position on the policy
continuum represents the position of the median voter in his or her
district. That is, we might imagine seven distributions of voter
preferences—one for each legislator’s district—surrounding each
legislator’s position on the policy continuum. In panels (a) and (b)
of Figure 3, the distribution of preferences for legislator L4’s
constituents are shown. Assuming relatively weak parties,167 if the
issue is equally salient and important to all constituents, L4 will be
the median voter in this legislature, and her position should prevail.
This is the situation depicted in panel (a). However, if L4’s
constituency includes high demanders, as depicted in panel (b),
those high demanders move L4, making R1 the new median voter
within the legislature.

interests, further exacerbating the underrepresentation of nonbusiness interests. Two good
post-Olsonian examinations of Olson’s ideas are RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1982) and TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992).
166. OLSON, supra note 165, at 33–34.
167. In this context the term “weak parties” means that the party in the legislature exerts
no voting discipline over its members. If parties were strong enough to determine and enforce
a party position on an issue, the majority party (the Left Party, in this example) might select a
favorite party position at, say, L3, and all four members of the left party might vote for that
policy. The assumption of weak parties, as used here, eliminates that possibility and
hypothesizes that legislators will vote in accordance with the preferences of their median
constituent in the absence of high demanders.
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In this way, organized interests can exert outsized influence over
legislative choices. However, we know from experience that
sometimes these organized interests can be overcome. The history of
American environmental law has seen so-called “republican
moments”—instances in which the broad interest in environmental
protection has overcome powerful, organized interests to produce
national legislative victories.168 A series of republican moments
produced one major piece of environmental legislation after another
during the 1970s.169 These republican moments benefited from
168. This idea comes from James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1990). Dan
Farber adapted it to environmental politics in Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in
Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992).
169. Indeed, for this reason, the 1970s (or, more accurately, the period running from
1969 through 1980) is sometimes referred to as “the environmental decade.” See, e.g., LETTIE
M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982). In addition to the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401–77671q (2006)) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387
(2006)), several other foundational environmental laws were enacted during this period,
including the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006)), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901
(2006)), the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006)), and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 42

1599

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 4:54 PM

2011

changes during the 1960s in three of the four elements of electoral
risk outlined above. First, the growth of mass media and
popularization of the science of ecology170 helped make
environmental issues more salient to the general public. Second,
according to public opinion polling, people cared about
environmental protection more than ever before (preference
intensity).171 Third, voters ascribed to Congress the power and
responsibility to remedy the problem, since neither states172 nor
courts173 had been able to do so (traceability). In this setting,
members of Congress acted as political entrepreneurs, concluding
that it was to their political advantage to respond to this
groundswell.
It may also be that these kinds of political choices are about
more than mere logical calculation. They are also about voters’
emotional attachments to favored positions or policies and
rationalization: the brain’s ability to conflate one’s self-interest with
one’s idea of what is best or right.174 Behavioral psychologists have
documented how various psychological “biases” can distort our

U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006), better known as “CERCLA” or “Superfund.”
170. Rachel Carson’s seminal best-seller, Silent Spring, was probably the best known
popularization of the ecological framework. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
171. For a good summary of how the public mobilized to support environmental
legislation in the early 1970s, see Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy
from the 1970s to the 1990s: Continuity and Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE
1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 3 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994).
172. For a summary of state and local efforts to regulate air emissions prior to the Clean
Air Act, see PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
241–48 (1994).
173. Perhaps the quintessential example of the inability or unwillingness of courts to
provide a comprehensive solution to pollution problems is found in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), in which the New York Court of Appeals refused to enjoin
pollution from a cement plant, noting:
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties
before it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public
issues. . . .
Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from solution . . . .
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private
litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in
the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area
beyond the circumference of one private lawsuit.
Id. at 871.
174. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 72–76 (2011).
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ability to gather information and make choices dispassionately and
objectively.175 Indeed, long before behavioral psychology emerged as
a discipline, James Madison understood the power of rationalization
in politics, noting that “[a]s long as the connection subsists between
[man’s] reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will
have a reciprocal influence on each other.”176 Thus, it is not simply
that we voters (and interest groups and firms) want what we want;
we also interpret the world in ways that justify what we want. Most
of this rationalization happens on a subconscious level.177 Therefore,
when business groups pull their legislator away from the median
voter’s position, neither they nor the legislator see it as a subversion
of the public interest. Rather, both groups rationalize the choice as
the “best” possible choice for all concerned. The same can be said
for republican moments. The environmental movement of the 1960s
and 70s was motivated not only by logic and science, but also by
emotion, moral certainty, and passion.178 Political entrepreneurs
(politicians and lobbyists) aroused that passion. Indeed, political
entrepreneurs are particularly adept at understanding and influencing
the way voters perceive issues and constructing appeals that lead
voters toward some positions and away from others.179 This is part of
what republican moments are about: not merely the education of
175. The so-called “confirmation bias,” in particular, can lead voters to seek out
information (and interpret information) so as to confirm their predispositions or beliefs. See
generally, SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993);
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
177. In the words of cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker:
Some debates are so entwined with people’s moral identity that one might despair
that they can ever be resolved by reason and evidence. Social psychologists have
found that with diverse moral issues, especially those on which liberals and
conservatives disagree, all combatants are intuitively certain that they are correct and
that their opponents have ugly ulterior motives. They argue out of respect for the
social convention that one should always provide reasons for one’s opinions, but
when an argument is refuted, they don’t change their minds but work harder to find
a replacement argument.
STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 281 (2002).
178. See e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK, THE POLITICS OF THE EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCOURSES 27–50, 183–202 (2d ed. 2005).
179. This may be what Henry Adams meant when he defined politics as “the systematic
organization of hatreds.” HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 7 (1918). It
may also be what Sir Lewis Namier had in mind when he said that “what matters most about
political ideas is the underlying emotions, the music to which ideas are a mere libretto, often a
very inferior quality.” SIR LEWIS NAMIER, PERSONALITIES AND POWERS 4 (1955).
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voters, but the activation of voters’ interest and passion about the
problem the regulatory legislation seeks to address.
Why, then, haven’t the efforts of today’s political entrepreneurs
to activate the greater mass of voters in favor of fundamental energy
policy reform borne more fruit? If climatologists are correct that the
earth is warming, that human activity is significantly contributing to
that warming, and that this poses a significant risk to human welfare,
why are average voters so much less united in support of those same
propositions?180 If most economic analyses suggest that the costs of
continuing to consume fossil fuels at current rates (in terms of
energy security, climate change, etc.) are likely to be large, and likely
to exceed the costs of combating climate change, why hasn’t
Congress enacted major energy policy reform? The short answer is
that both the issue environment and the political environment are
different and less supportive of a republican moment now than in the
1970s. Organized interests have more at stake now, and the central
issues in the energy policy debate are more complex, both technically
and politically. Consequently, a republican moment in favor of
energy policy reform in 2010 is more difficult to achieve.
B. Organized Interests and Energy Policy Reform
Obviously, energy policy reform threatens well-heeled, wellorganized, and powerful business interests. The central provisions of

180. Indeed, the relative apathy and division that characterizes American opinion on
climate change issues stands in stark contrast to the relative unity among climatologists. Polling
data seem inconclusive on these issues. In a 2009 poll, Americans were asked, “Do you believe
climate change is a major threat, a minor threat, or no real threat?” Fifty-eight percent
responded that it was either a minor threat or no threat at all. Environment,
POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2011). In another poll, only thirty-six percent of Americans attributed global warming to
human activity, and less than half had heard of “cap and trade” schemes being proposed to
address it. Press Release, The Pew Research Center, Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of
Global
Warming
2–3
(Oct.
22,
2009),
available
at
http://peoplepress.org/2009/10/22/fewer-americans-see-solid-evidence-of-global-warming. On the other
hand, polling by Stanford University’s Jon Krosnick points toward majority American support
for action to combat climate change, though that support does not approach the kind of
consensus found in the scientific community. See Jon A. Krosnick, Op-Ed., The Climate
Majority, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A25; see also Jon Krosnick, Large Majority of
Americans Support Government Solutions to Address Global Warming, WOODS INST. FOR THE
ENV’T (June 9, 2010), http://woods.stanford.edu/research/americans-support-govtsolutions-global-warming.html;
Environment,
POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm (last accessed Nov. 5, 2011) (the data assembled
by PollingReport.com seems to support this kind of conceptual support for action).
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the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills pose real risks for
businesses in the oil and gas industry, the coal industry, the public
utility industry, the automobile industry, and the real estate and
homebuilding industries, among others. These industries know
much more about energy policy reform than the average voter. More
importantly, they have more at stake in this fight and have active
lobbyists.181 An older EIA analysis estimated that reducing American
greenhouse gas emissions to Kyoto levels would reduce coal-fired
generation by about 50% because a sizable minority of existing coalfired power plants would be unable to compete in electricity
markets.182 That same analysis predicted about a 33% increase in
electric rates (from 6.1 cents per kwh to 8.1 cents per kwh) were the
United States to commit itself to meeting its greenhouse gas
reduction commitments under the Kyoto accord.183 A more recent
analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill (which would have back loaded
those costs to utilities by freely allocating pollution allowances in the
early years of the program) projects only minimal electricity price
increases at first, but ultimate increases of about 19% (above the
reference case) by 2030.184
Oil refineries would face similar costs. Many of these costs would
be passed on to consumers. Expensive electricity or gasoline not only
upsets consumers (read: voters), but also poses a risk to the already
struggling American auto industry whose congressional
representatives come from political swing states in the Midwest.
Some fossil fuel companies have indicated that they would favor a
carbon tax over Clean Air Act regulation or a marketable permit
system,185 but they prefer no emissions reductions at all.186 Of course,

181. One article referred to the Waxman-Markey bill as a “Super Bowl” for lobbyists.
Lisa Lerer & Erika Lovley, Warming Bill the Super Bowl for Lobbyists, POLITICO (June 4,
2008), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0608/10813.html. One 2009 analysis
indicated that in 2008 about fifteen percent of all Washington lobbyists were working on the
subject of climate change. Marianne Lavelle, The Climate Change Lobby Explosion, CENTER
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.iwatchnews.org/node/4593.
182. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES FOR
REDUCING MULTIPLE EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS WITH ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY SCENARIOS, at xiv tbl.ES2 (2001), available at http://www.eia.gov/
oiaf/servicerpt/eppats/pdf/sroiaf(2001)05.pdf.
183. Id.
184. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF H.R. 2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 36–
48 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/index.html.
185. See Opinion Leaders, CARBON TAX CENTER (May 11, 2009), http://
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these interests perceive mandatory greenhouse gas emissions
reductions as a threat regardless of the regulatory instrument used to
pursue that goal.
The Waxman-Markey bill’s proposal for a national RPS also has
opponents. Some claim that the RPS would lead to a rise in retail
electricity prices for many customers, not only because renewable
sources of electricity are more expensive, but also because of the
need for new high-voltage transmission lines.187 For its part, the EIA
does not project increases in the national average electricity price
from a national RPS until after the year 2020, with “peak effects” on
national average prices remaining below three percent.188 The EIA’s
analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill projects that it would produce
significant increases in renewable resources, increases that would
come at the expense of natural gas and coal generation, threatening
the coal and gas value chains.189 Not surprisingly, representatives of
coal and gas interests oppose the bill, arguing that it will increase
energy costs190 and could lead to job losses that would far
www.carbontax.org/who-supports/opinion-leaders (quoting past statements supportive of a
carbon tax from CEOs of Exxon-Mobil, Sempra, Dynegy, and Duke Energy).
186. Greg Pullian, The Advantages of a Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax for Emissions
Reduction, 3 LAMP 25–26 (2009), available at http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/
files/news_pub_lamp_2009-3.pdf (Exxon Mobil Vice President of Environmental Policy and
Planning proposing that the carbon tax rate be “updated periodically based on actual
performance versus the emissions goals established by policy makers”).
187. PATRICK SULLIVAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THREE PROPOSED ELECTRICITY STANDARDS 5 (2009), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45877.pdf. Proponents have disputed this claim,
however, and insist that transmission would be much less of an issue for biomass power
development in the South, which would either require no new infrastructure or involve shorter
distances, smaller volumes, and lower costs than that which could be required for, for example,
remote farm locations in the Midwest. FRED SISSINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34116,
RENEWABLE ENERGY PORTFOLIO STANDARD (RPS): BACKGROUND AND DEBATE OVER A
NATIONAL REQUIREMENT 8–9 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL34116_20071205.pdf.
188. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., IMPACTS OF A 25-PERCENT
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY STANDARD AS PROPOSED IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND
SECURITY ACT, at v–vi (2000) (discussion draft).
189. Id. at v.
190. The EIA has indicated that a national RPS would have only a moderate effect on
average prices, adding less than two cents per kwh to rates. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, IMPACTS OF A 15-PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD, at v
(2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/prps/index.html. However,
this mean effect may belie widely varying effects in different parts of the country; in most
places, two cents per kwh represents a fifteen to thirty percent increase in electricity rates. The
U.S. Department of Energy’s Green Power Network publishes an index of the premiums
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outnumber any jobs created to meet a government-mandated
RPS.191 If members of Congress suspect that their constituents are
unwilling to pay two cents more per kwh for electricity, they are
unlikely to support a national RPS.
Politicians from the southeastern United States argue further
that a national RPS represents a wealth transfer from “renewable
resource poor” parts of the country (largely in the Southeast) to
renewable resource rich parts of the country (the windy plains and
coasts, and the sunny Southwest).192 This argument is not terribly
compelling because the status quo benefits states that are blessed
with natural deposits of fossil fuels or that chose to shift
environmental costs to the rest of us by burning those fuels.193
Nonetheless, the fact remains that legislators from the southeastern
United States appear to see the national RPS as threat to their
constituents, and they oppose it.
Certainly, the legislative process to date reflects the impact of
industry and regional opposition to fundamental energy policy
reform. During early consideration of the Waxman-Markey bill,
Republicans in the Energy and Commerce Committee offered more
than 400 amendments in an unsuccessful attempt to kill the bill.
Energy industry lobbyists secured the removal of the original
provision requiring that 100% of the tradable greenhouse gas
emissions permits be auctioned off to industry; that provision was
replaced by one calling for (mostly) free distribution of permits. For
its part, the Kerry-Boxer bill did not include provision for a national

electric utilities charge for renewable power in various states. While these data do not measure
the overall cost impacts of an RPS, they do seem to reflect a larger than two cents per kwh
premium for renewable power in some parts of the country. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, GREEN
Pricing Utility Programs by State, GREEN POWER NETWORK (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/pricing.shtml?page=1.
191. 110 CONG. REC. H9849, 9851 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007).
192. Specifically, they have claimed that a renewables standard would “create hardship for
states and regions with low amounts of renewable resources . . . .” These opponents have cited
the southeastern states as an example, claiming that even though these states are producing
some biomass power technologies, these technologies are “not yet ready for commercial use.”
SISSINE, supra note 187, at 8–10, 12.
193. That is, there is no inherent justice in the status quo, and no inherent injustice in a
policy change that alters that status quo. Second, even if the southeastern states cannot exploit
solar and wind resources, they have an ample supply of biomass, which qualifies as a renewable
resource under the national RPS provisions contained in the Waxman-Markey bill. H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. § 126 (2009).
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RPS at all, in part because of opposition of southeastern state
senators.
Consequently, the Kerry-Boxer bill was stalled in the Senate in
October of 2009 when the “Gang of Three” Senators Kerry and
Graham (not yet joined by Lieberman) first announced their plans to
seek the sixty votes needed to force a climate bill onto the Senate
floor. They indicated that they would include additional nuclear
power incentives and domestic drilling provisions in their proposed
legislative language to “win over undecided Democrats and at least a
handful of Republicans.”194 They apparently also included provisions
allocating funding for carbon sequestration technology (to appease
Democrats from states that produce or use large amounts of coal)195
and lowered the greenhouse gas emissions reduction requirements
below those proposed in the Kerry-Boxer bill, in part to appease
Senator Max Baucus (D–Mont.), who had voted against Kerry-Boxer
in committee.196 Other concessions included exempting the oil
industry from cap-and-trade regulation and instead subjecting
transportation fuels to a carbon tax,197 and delaying the imposition of
cap-and-trade requirements on manufacturers.198 In making these
changes, the Gang of Three’s goal seems to have been to win
business and regional support or to reduce business and regional
opposition to this legislation.199
194. Dean Scott, Kerry Sees Delay in Unveiling Framework; Murkowski Ponders “Net
Zero” Carbon Tax, 40 ENVTL. REP. CURRENT DEV. 2755, 2756 (2009).
195. Coral Davenport, Climate Bill Advances in GOP’s Absence, 2009 CQ WEEKLY 2594,
available at http://library.cqpress.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111000003243411.
196. Leora Falk, Senators Seek 17 Percent Emissions Cut, Support for Nuclear Power in
Compromise, 40 ENVTL. REP. CURRENT DEV. 2814, 2815 (2009).
197. While oil companies have fiercely opposed any new regulations or fees, “they like
that as an industry they will not be hit with new production fees, since the cost will go directly
to consumers.” Coral Davenport, A Plan Designed to Stem Opposition, 2010 CQ WKLY. 976.
198. Id. This concession was sought by the National Association of Manufacturers and
Rust Belt lawmakers. The National Association of Manufacturers had earlier issued an analysis
of the Waxman-Markey bill that had predicted it would reduce American GDP levels by as
much as 2.4 % (or $571 billion). AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & NAT’L ASS’N OF
MFRS., ANALYSIS OF THE WAXMAN-MARKEY BILL 4 (2009), available at
http://www.accf.org/media/dynamic/3/media_387.pdf. Still, Rust Belt Democrats want an
even better deal and have indicated that their support for the delayed cap-and-trade program is
contingent upon other “sweeteners such as new government loans for clean energy technology
manufacturing, cost-containment measures for manufacturers facing higher energy bills, and
the creation of a ‘carbon tariff’ imposing fees on imported goods from countries that don’t
regulate carbon pollution.” Davenport, supra note 197, at 977.
199. As Senator Graham said, “At the end of the day, if the environmental policies we are

1606

DO NOT DELETE

1561

12/13/2011 4:54 PM

Regulation, “Republican Moments”

The energy industry may have another reason to be even more
determined in its opposition to current energy legislation now than it
was to energy and environmental legislation in the 1970s. In the era
before restructuring of gas and electricity markets, gas and electric
utilities were much more vertically integrated than they are now, and
most of the costs imposed on the gas and electric utility industry by
statutes like the NGPA, PURPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean
Water Act were recoverable from their customers through rates.200
Wholesale and retail electric rates were set by regulators (the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and state PUCs, respectively); these
agencies permitted utilities to recover fuel and regulatory costs from
their customers.201 Consequently, while price increases back then
might have led to some conservation and fuel switching, individual
companies had no need to fear widespread loss of customers as a
result of these policy changes. By contrast, today’s energy utilities
face a much less secure environment. As described above in Part I,
wholesale sellers (and some retail sellers) now compete for customers
and sell their energy at market rates. Companies whose electric
generation mix is heavily dependent upon coal will be hit harder by
greenhouse gas emissions regulation. We can expect those companies
to be doubly nervous about energy policy reform.
C. The Issue Environment and Party Politics
Irrespective of the strength and determination of the opponents
of reform, the question remains why pro-reform political
entrepreneurs have not been better able to activate voters in support
of reform. After all, the energy and environmental legislation of the
1970s also posed risks to the energy industry. By deregulating
natural gas wellhead prices, the NGPA of 1978 posed a risk to gas
utilities that the gas they purchased might become much more
seeking are not good for business, we will not get 60 votes.” Falk, supra note 196, at 2815; see
also Press Release, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham, Graham on Energy Independence and
Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/yjgall9.
200. Fuel costs are routinely passed through in traditional rate cases. Investments in
technology to comply with environmental regulation are part of the utility’s “rate base,” the
capital investment on which it is authorized to earn a fair return. Only investments which are
deemed to be imprudently made are disallowed, and investments associated with mandatory
environmental controls will always be considered prudent.
201. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (2000), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/
chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf.
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expensive, and the price more volatile. Its companion, PURPA,
posed a similar risk to electric utilities by requiring them to purchase
power from new merchant electric generating plants. Likewise, the
Clean Air Act increased the cost of exploiting fossil fuels for energy,
and triggered stiff opposition from the energy industry. If that
opposition could be overcome then, what makes the politics of
energy policy reform today any different?
1. Technical complexity and salience
The technical complexity of the issues involved complicates the
task of rallying mass support for reform and can make the current
generation of environmental, energy security, and efficiency
problems seem less salient. The energy and environmental legislation
of the 1970s was aimed at problems that were, compared to the
problem of climate change, relatively immediate and tractable.
Politicians could make a relatively straightforward case to voters that
passage of regulatory legislation would address easily identifiable
harms of pollution or security of energy supply. Voters in the 1970s
worried about the price of energy, but they worried far more about
perceived threats to energy security or to health and the
environment. When the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act were
enacted in the early 1970s, voters could see (and smell) the harm
that the laws would avoid. Air pollution in cities was far worse than it
is today. The Santa Barbara oil spill, the Cuyahoga River fire, and the
“death” of Lake Erie, all represented tangible, immediate costs that
voters wanted to avoid. Simultaneously, the oil shocks of the 1970s
created real fears about energy security. These catalyzing events
helped political entrepreneurs activate pro-reform voters and
mobilize support for environmental and energy legislation of the
1970s.
Today’s political entrepreneurs have been attempting to use
catalyzing events to mobilize support for fighting climate change and
increasing energy security. Former Vice President Al Gore and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) won (jointly) a
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to educate the public about the
risks associated with climate change.202 The Pew Center for Climate
Change and countless other nongovernmental organizations seek the
202. Walter Gibbs, Gore Shares Peace Prize for Climate Change Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2007, at A1.
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same goals. The sponsors of energy policy reform legislation in the
House and Senate are political entrepreneurs as well. Despite these
efforts, the political calculus remains difficult. The effects of climate
change—receding polar ice caps and glaciers, and the threat of slowly
rising sea levels—are important; but they are not nearly as immediate
to most American voters as were the environmental problems voters
faced in the 1970s. Moreover, climatologists do not agree on the
nature and distribution of the likely impacts of climate change, their
magnitude, the degree to which humans will be able to adapt in ways
that minimize impacts, etc. Opponents of reform can exploit these
divisions, portraying the science behind climate change as shaky or
uncertain.203 Consequently, while opponents can make relatively
confident and specific claims about the costs associated with
greenhouse gas emissions limitations, efficiency codes, tighter CAFE
standards, or a national RPS, proponents of reform cannot respond
nearly as confidently or specifically about the costs of inaction.204
2. Traceability
During the 1970s, it was clear that the benefits of reform
legislation would accrue mostly to Americans.205 Congress reasonably
203.Indeed, opponents have done just that, particularly in connection with a series of
revelations in late 2009 and early 2010 which they called “climategate.” These included
revelations of errors in the most recent IPCC assessment and disclosure of embarrassing emails from a major climate research center. These revelations did not really undermine the
scientific foundation of the case for anthropogenic-based global warming. In a recent edition
of the journal Science, 255 members of the National Academy of Sciences published a letter
addressing climategate, stating that
[T]here is nothing remotely identified in the recent events that changes the
fundamental conclusions about climate change:
(i) The planet is warming due to increased concentrations of heat-trapping
gases in our atmosphere [and]. . . .
(ii) Most of the increase in the concentration of these gases over the last
century is due to human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels and
deforestation.
Jennifer Sills, ed., Climate Change and the Integrity of Science, 328 SCIENCE 689, 689 (2010).
Nevertheless, climategate seems to have undermined public confidence in climate change
science. The Climate Action Network, which follows public opinion polling data in the wake of
climategate demonstrates this phenomenon. See Tracking Public Attitudes About Climate
Change—Latest
Polls,
CLIMATE
ACTION
NETWORK
(June
16,
2011),
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/hot-topics/climate-polling.
204. See MASTRANDREA, supra note 57, at 30–35 (discussing the effect of assumptions
about adaptation on cost estimates).
205. Certainly, the Clean Air Act benefited Canadians by imposing emissions controls on
midwestern American power plants. Furthermore, we were not certain of it at the time, but
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expected then that most voters would see those benefits within their
lifetimes.206 Thus, voters could expect not only to bear the costs of
pollution control, but also to capture most of the benefits. Likewise,
it was relatively easy for voters in 1978 to see how deregulating
natural gas prices might lead to increases in supply and decreases in
consumption, thereby alleviating the perceived natural gas shortage.
It was easy to understand how PURPA’s financial incentives for
alternative energy projects might lead to a more diversified and
efficient electricity supply. Consequently, legislators could take credit
for addressing these problems and for any progress that could be
traced back to those statutes. Indeed, as it happened, most of these
statutes produced results relatively quickly. The deregulation of
natural gas prices rebalanced gas markets by increasing supply and
reducing demand far more quickly than legislators expected.207 The
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act represent enormous success
stories, having drastically reduced air and water emissions in real
terms, despite growth in population, economic activity, and vehicle
miles traveled since their passage.208
By contrast, greenhouse gas emissions reductions, increased
energy efficiency, and a national RPS are all aimed (at least partly) at
the problem of climate change; their costs will fall on today’s voters,
while most of the benefits will accrue to future generations of
Americans and to citizens of other countries. This makes it far more
difficult for political entrepreneurs to activate today’s voters in favor
of reform. Since some greenhouse gases persist in the atmosphere for
more than fifty years after being emitted, the benefits of action now
will accrue not so much to this generation or the next, but to the
ones after that. Similarly, some voters fear that in the absence of
emissions reductions in China and India,209 the benefits of
Europeans were to benefit from American emissions reductions as well. We now know that
some pollutants travel across the oceans to be deposited on continents other than those from
which they were emitted.
206. The effects of most emissions under the Clean Air Act were felt locally. We now
have a better understanding of the way in which sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are
transported in the atmosphere and recognize that they can sometimes cross entire oceans to be
deposited on different continents. However, this is the exception rather than the rule.
207. Pierce, supra note 11.
208. Robin Lloyd, Success Stories: Cleaning Up Planet Earth, LIVE SCIENCE (April 22,
2009, 4:33 AM), http://www.livescience.com/environment/090422-earth-day-success.html.
209. Since Kyoto, negotiations over the next steps in combating climate change have
broken down repeatedly over the question of whether developing nations like China and India
ought to commit to emissions reductions. They have steadfastly refused to do so, which was a
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greenhouse gas emissions reductions may never be realized. It is one
thing for members of Congress to urge voters to incur the costs of
combating global warming because the United States has
contributed so much to the problem; it is more difficult to do so if
the benefits may never be realized because emissions growth in the
developing world will overwhelm American emissions reductions.210
Even if one accepts the sensible rejoinder that the industrialized
world ought to be the first mover on this issue because it built its
wealth on the back of uncontrolled fossil fuel emissions,211 the nature
of the greenhouse effect is such that emissions reductions in the
United States (or Europe or anywhere) accrue to the benefit of the
entire world. This is the tragedy of the commons212 on its grandest
(and, therefore, most powerful) scale yet. It may only be fair to
future generations and to citizens of the world for the United States
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions now, but it is very difficult for
members of Congress to enact legislation when the costs will fall
entirely on their constituents and most of the benefits will fall
elsewhere and in the distant future. For members of Congress, the
politics of energy policy reform are very difficult indeed.
3. Policy complexity
Just as the technical complexity of climate change (the relative
uncertainty about the magnitude and distribution of its effects)
makes it harder for political entrepreneurs to mobilize support for
energy policy reform, so too does its policy complexity. Even where
there is agreement on the need for action, there is widespread
disagreement among social scientists and policy analysts about how to
sticking point at the most recent negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. John M.
Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in Five Nations Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, December 19,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/
19climate.html.
210. There is evidence that voters care more about local environmental issues than global
ones. See David M. Konisky et al., Environmental Policy Attitudes: Issues, Geographical Scale,
and Political Trust, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 1066 (2008).
211. The developing world is at a point on its growth curve that the developed world was
at long before it began regulating air emissions from fossil fuel combustion. There is a strong
argument that it would be unfair for Americans to insist now that China foregoes the kind of
growth that Americans enjoyed—that is, growth based upon the exploitation of cheap energy
without regulation designed to internalize social and environmental costs. According to this
argument, at the very least, the United States ought to limit its own greenhouse gas emissions
before it insists that China do so.
212. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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reform our energy policy. These disagreements undermine the ability
of political entrepreneurs to make a simple and straightforward case
for reform to their constituents.
For example, economists extol the virtues of carbon taxes,
arguing that a tax (once set at the correct level) is the most efficient
way to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas emissions.213
Regulated firms also tend to prefer taxes to tradable permit systems
because they provide cost certainty: the cost of acquiring tradable
permits can vary over time according to the forces of supply and
demand, while the tax rate tends to be more stable and
predictable.214 However, environmental groups care less about cost
certainty and more about predicting the level of pollution.215 A cap
and trade marketable permit system provides the certainty
environmentalists want by capping total emissions at a
predetermined level.
Because new taxes seem to be a political nonstarter in the
American policy debate, both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer
bills propose tradable permit systems for managing greenhouse gas
emissions. While cap and trade is more cost efficient than traditional
permitting,216 it is vulnerable to other criticisms. For example, some
critics of tradable permits point to problems with the European
Union’s carbon trading scheme217 and to fears that speculators will
make prices in these markets high or volatile.218 These criticisms feed

213. Economists have preferred environmental taxes since the time of A.C. Pigou, who
first advocated taxing pollution. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932); see
also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(2d ed. 1975).
214. ExxonMobil, for example, has taken this position. Pullian, supra note 186.
215. See, e.g., James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity
Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 229 (2008), available at
http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2008/2008_Hansen_etal.pdf (high-profile climatologist
suggesting “an initial objective of reducing atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm,” which later inspired
a 350 movement largely organized by the environmental group, 350.org).
216. It is more efficient in that it sought to allow firms within an industry to accomplish
pollution reductions at a lower cost than traditional permitting.
217. The EU scheme unfolded in two stages. During the first stage, too many permits
were distributed (and hoarded by their owners). When the glut of permits was revealed, the
price of permits dropped precipitously, from a high of more than thirty euros per ton to a low
of less than four euros per ton. Frank J. Convery & Luke Redmond, Market and Price
Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 1 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON.
POL’Y 88, 103 (2007).
218. See, e.g., Robert J. Shapiro & Elaine C. Kamarck, Goldman Scandal Erodes Case for
Cap
and
Trade,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Apr.
10,
2010,
http://
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into a public perception that these kinds of markets may be
unworkable and risky. Opponents of reform have tried to exploit this
disagreement and confusion over the efficacy of various regulatory
instruments by, for example, calling the cap and trade proposals of
Waxman-Markey “cap and tax.”219 From the left, environmental
justice advocates worry that a marketable permit program can create
emissions “hotspots” around facilities that buy permits, though this
issue is more of a concern with respect to emissions of pollutants
other than GHGs, which tend to disperse in the atmosphere.220
Some proponents of reform are lukewarm—even skeptical—
about our ability to attack the problem at the tailpipe or smokestack.
The real problem, they say, is not how much pollution we emit, but
rather our use of fossil fuels in the first place. Proponents of this view
tend to favor policies that promote technological change, efficiency,
and conservation. One proponent of a national RPS, Lincoln Davies,
argues that the RPS is a more effective way to combat climate change
than emissions regulations.221 A closely related view contends that
the only reasonable policies are those that focus on developing the
low-carbon or carbon-free technologies that developing countries
like China or India can use to grow. According to this view, until the
developed world recognizes the developing world’s right to use as
much energy per capita as the developed world does now, we cannot
make any reasonable progress on the issue of climate change.222 For

www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-j-shapiro/goldman-scandal-erodes-ca_b_554137.html
(contributor to progressive news website questioning the ability of regulators to “effectively
oversee a new carbon market”).
219. See, e.g., Editorial, The Cap and Tax Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2009, at A12.
220. However, a forthcoming assessment by David Adelman shows that in most parts of
the country, industrial sources contribute a small percentage of the cancer risk from air toxics,
even in places where those industrial emissions are concentrated. David Adelman, The
Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: Implications for Greenhouse Gas Trading Regimes
and Industrial Hot Spots (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
221. See Lincoln Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1341, 1341–1403 (2010).
222. Rutgers’s law professor Howard Latin takes this view. He says,
Even Herculean mitigation efforts will take several decades at best before we can
make major progress in transforming these GHG sources into climate-safe
alternatives. Utopian visions of avoiding climate “tipping points” in the next decade
are completely unrealistic. If there are looming tipping points, which may well be
true, they are inescapably going to be tipped or tripped over. My concern is that
emergency efforts to prevent what cannot be avoided are likely to lead to waste,
foolishness, international conflicts and general disillusionment on an epic scale. I
believe we must start NOW to begin the transition to a carbon-free energy system
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their part, energy efficiency proponents see far more promise in
energy efficiency than in emissions regulation; this reflects the belief
that there is more environmental bang for the buck in efficiency
improvements, and the fear that emissions reduction legislation
seems like a politically intractable problem.223 When supporters of
reform cannot agree on the wisdom of the instruments of reform, it
makes the job of pro-reform political entrepreneurs that much more
difficult.
There is another way in which policy complexity can undermine
the mobilization of support for energy reform, particularly in
connection with large, complex bills like Waxman-Markey. Each of
the regulatory instruments included in the bill advances some of the
bill’s goals, but undermines others. For example, policies promoting
the substitution of renewable electricity for fossil fuels will produce
environmental benefits (reductions in greenhouse gas and other
fossil fuel emissions) and reduce dependence on foreign oil; however,
they also reduce reliability of supply because renewable sources like
wind and solar power are intermittent.224 Similarly, policies
promoting the substitution of electric vehicles for gasoline powered
vehicles reduce dependence upon foreign oil, bringing all of the
security and foreign policy benefits that reduced energy dependence
entails. However, if the electricity used to power electric cars comes
in large part from coal (as it does in most of the country today), that
transition may exacerbate the global warming problem. Likewise, we

and economy. Efforts to solve global warming by GHG emissions reductions
strategies, rather than GHG replacement strategies, cannot realistically succeed over
the short-term or the long-term or any term . . . .
Howard Latin, Comment to Varied Views on Poverty and Climate, NY TIMES DOT EARTH
(Nov. 28, 2007 5:05 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/varied-viewson-poverty-and-climate-change/.
223. See Dernbach, supra note 92, at 10,003–18.
224. We do not yet have the capability to store electricity in large amounts, and these
sources produce power only when the wind blows or the sun shines. Some wind and solar
stations are backed up by more conventionally fueled plants, like natural gas facilities. The need
for this kind of support adds costs to what are already relatively expensive technologies for
producing electricity. Researchers and entrepreneurs are working on coupling wind and solar
power with on-site storage capabilities, such as compressed air and flywheels, but none of these
technologies has developed sufficiently to be commercialized. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.,
Electric Power in the Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
821, 870 n.444 (2010) (“Other storage systems that have yet to be commercially proven
include batteries, compressed air storage, pumped hydroelectricity, fly wheels, and molten
salts.”); Drew Thornley, Texas Wind Energy: Past, Present, and Future, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L.
& POL’Y J. 69, 97–103 (2009).

1614

DO NOT DELETE

1561

12/13/2011 4:54 PM

Regulation, “Republican Moments”

can reduce emissions of greenhouse gases significantly by moving
away from coal-fired power to solar power; however, coal is a
relatively cheap and plentiful domestic source of energy, while most
solar photovoltaic cells are made with imported silicon.225
Thus, modern energy policy reform requires an extraordinary
number of hard choices that involve tradeoffs and great uncertainty.
These tensions complicate an already difficult and complex debate
even further.
4. Party, ideology, and emotion
Finally, the partisan political environment in 2010 seems less
conducive to a pro-reform republican moment than the partisan
political environment of the 1970s. Whether or not American
politics was less ideological or partisan in the 1970s (and it is not
clear that it was), it is clear that in the 1970s the two major political
parties did not differ so distinctly on energy and environmental
policy issues as they do now. At the time the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act were passed, both major political parties claimed
the mantle of environmental leadership. A Republican president,
Richard Nixon, signed into law both of these landmark
environmental statutes, having previously created the Environmental
Protection Agency by executive order.226 A Democrat, Jimmy Carter,
signed the NGPA, a statute whose deregulatory policy aims we
might associate with the Republican Party today. Even as recently as
twenty years ago, Republican George H. W. Bush signed the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments creating the acid rain program and ran
for office claiming to be “the environmental president.”227 We do
not see that sort of bipartisanship on environmental and energy
issues much anymore; to the contrary, partisan differences are now
the norm.228 The 2010 Senate’s Gang of Three represented an
225. There are, of course, rejoinders to these arguments. Some photovoltaic solar
technologies use cadmium or other silicon substitutes. Concentrated solar technologies do not
rely upon rare elements like silicon. And solar power is not the only alternative to coal. Nuclear
power is a more likely substitute, since both coal and nuclear energy serve as base load sources
of supply. Uranium is a relatively secure fuel source in that we produce it domestically and can
import it from stable, friendly regimes (e.g., Canada or Australia).
226. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (July 9, 1970),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2010), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
227. LESLIE DALE FELDMAN & ROSANNA PEROTTI, HONOR AND LOYALTY: INSIDE THE
POLITICS OF THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE 8 (2002).
228. Riley Dunlap, a leading authority on environmental opinion, has documented this
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attempt at bipartisanship in the Senate; but three senators does not a
“gang” make, and the gang lost its only Republican member shortly
after its creation due to an unrelated partisan dispute.229 Lately,
conflict over energy and the environment—like other conflicts over
major healthcare, financial, and energy legislation—seems to break
sharply along partisan lines.230
Ideological polarization within Congress on energy and
environmental issues is part of a larger trend. Political scientists agree
that party polarization in Congress has been increasing over the last
forty years.231 This polarization manifests itself in a variety of ways,
including increases in party line voting and differences between the
polarization process, tracing it to the early 1980s. He says that opinion on environmental
issues is most polarized among elites. See Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, A Widening
Gap: Republican and Democratic Views on Climate Change, 50 ENV’T 26, 28 (2008); see also
Konisky et al., supra note 210, at 1066, 1077–78 (finding partisan differences between
Democrats and Republicans on support for environmental policy initiatives and a strong
connection between political ideology and support for environmental regulation).
229. See Stephen Power, U.S. News: One Top Obama Goal, Climate Bill, at Risk, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 26, 2010, at A4 (reporting that Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham announced his
departure from the effort because Democratic leaders wanted to address immigration
legislation in advance of energy legislation).
230. Richard Lazarus recounted the growing partisan division on environmental issues in
2003. Using the League of Conservation Voters environmental scorecard of members of
Congress, Lazarus illustrates a growing partisanship in voting on environmental issues in
Congress. See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1011–13 (2003). Of course, the League of Conservation Voters
assign members of Congress voting scores based upon its desire to move members toward a
more pro-environmental position. In that sense, its scores are not objective measures of
environmentalism. However, Lazarus’s observations seem consistent with the dwindling
numbers of liberal and moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress since
1970. See infra notes 23131–34 and accompanying text.
231. There are a variety of measures used to document this polarization. One of the
better known is Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s so-called ‘DW-NOMINATE” data,
which places members of Congress on an ideological spectrum based upon their voting
behavior. For a thorough explanation of these data and how they document increasing
polarization in American politics, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES
(2006). For a striking visual illustration of polarization in Congress, see Keith Poole’s webpage
at http://voteview.com/polarizedamerica.asp. For a good overview of the various databases
and theories of congressional polarization, and an integration of some of those theories and
data, see SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); see also JOHN H.
ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
AMERICA (1995); KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICALECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams,
Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008); Morris P.
Fiorina, Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting at
Chicago, Illinois, Whatever Happened to the Median Voter? (Apr. 15–17, 1999).
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parties’ voting behavior.232 This trend has been ascribed by political
scientists to a number of factors, including increasing ideological
homogeneity in congressional districts233 and various kinds of
institutional changes that affect how parties manage congressional
business.234 Whatever the reasons, parties have become more
ideologically pure and ideologically further from one another over
time, making bipartisan cooperation toward energy reform that
much more difficult.
There is another important difference in the political setting
today compared with the 1970s. The environmental legislation of
the 1970s was part of a family of left-leaning social movements,
which included the civil rights movement, the consumer movement,
and the antiwar movement. The environmental movement produced
republican moments in Congress in part because the fervor and
energy of the general public was behind it. The same can be said of
the energy bills of the late 1970s, which then President Jimmy
Carter described as “the moral equivalent of war.”235 Because of this
fervor, members of Congress in the 1970s might reasonably have
worried more about how their actions might affect the votes of those
favoring regulation and reform than those opposing it. That does
not seem to be the case today. To the contrary, nowadays most of
the populist energy seems to be coming from the right wing of the
political spectrum: right wing populists (who often oppose federal
regulation of the private sector) seem to be the modern analogues of
the left-wing populists of the 60s and 70s (who demanded federal
regulation). To today’s member of Congress, environmental issues
232. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 2311, at 88; THERIAULT, supra note 231, at 3–
9.
233. Some ascribe this increasing homogeneity to redistricting. See e.g., Jamie Carson,
Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, & David W. Rohde, Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Linking Congressional Districts
Across Time: Redistricting and Party Polarization in Congress (2004). Others argue that voters
are segregating themselves ideologically. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. STONECASH, MARK D. BREWER,
& MARK D. MARIANI, DIVERGING PARTIES: SOCIAL CHANGE, REALIGNMENT, AND PARTY
POLARIZATION (2003); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint:
Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOC. 408 (2008).
Still others see party activists as exacerbating partisan conflict. Geoffrey C. Layman et al.,
Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324
(2010).
234. For a good summary of the institutional explanations of party polarization, see
generally THERIAULT, supra note 231, at 3–9.
235. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., Speech to the Nation (Apr. 18, 1977),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/filmmore/ps_energy.html.
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may seem far more salient to those who oppose action than to those
who favor it.
There may be another dynamic at work here, one that helps
explain the inability of pro-reform political entrepreneurs to move
public opinion and activate voters. Some analysts point to
psychological factors—the confirmation bias and the more general
human tendency to rationalize to reduce cognitive dissonance—that
can lead voters to harden their positions on “hot button” issues like
climate change. In a recent paper, Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith,
and Donald Braman examined the question of why voters cling to
assessments of risk—including assessment of the risks posed by
climate change—that differ so significantly from the prevailing
opinion of experts or scientists.236 The authors chose a series of issues
on which (i) experts had reached something close to consensus, but
(ii) public opinion lagged behind that consensus. The authors
hypothesized that people who tend toward more hierarchical and
individualistic worldviews (“hierarchical individualists”), would tend
to discredit the scientific basis of global warming than people who
tend toward more egalitarian and communitarian worldviews
(“egalitarian communitarians”). They found that when presented
with a fictional scientific expert advocating the propositions that
global temperatures are increasing and that human activity is causing
global warming hierarchical individualists were more likely to
discredit the expertise of the expert making those claims.237 The
subjects of the experiment tended to rationalize to avoid cognitive
dissonance.238 Certainly, this “cultural cognition of risk” could be
part of the reason why public perceptions of climate change risks
(and support for reform) lag behind those of climatologists and
other experts.
236. Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of
Scientific Consensus (Yale Law Sch., Research, Working Paper No. 205, 2011).
237. As the authors note, this experiment builds upon work in psychology on “identityprotective cognition,” which says that individuals tend to resist factual claims that behavior and
importance to their cultural roles is harmful and should be regulated. See David K. Sherman &
Geoffrey L. Coleman, The Psychology of Self-Defense: Self Affirmation Theory, 38 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 183 (2006). Another mechanism supporting this hypothesis
would be the “assimilation bias,” which contends that people assimilate facts in ways that
support their cultural predispositions and undermine opposing predispositions.
238. Kahan et al., supra note 236, at 13. This kind of rationalization is not limited to
hierarchical individualists. The authors found that egalitarian communitarians discredited the
existence of a scientific consensus in favor of the safety of geological disposal of nuclear waste.
Id. at 16.
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Data from a recent poll seem to support the notion that climate
change skeptics have hardened their positions in this way. A May
2011 joint report issued by Yale University’s Project on Climate
Change Communication and George Mason University Center on
Climate Change Communication separated poll respondents into six
groups representing the continuum of climate change opinion, as
reflected in Figure 4. Those at the left end of the continuum had the
strongest belief in global warming science, were most concerned
about the problem, and were the most motivated to do something
about it. Those at the right end of the continuum had the weakest
belief in climate change science and were the least concerned and
motivated to take action.
Respondents in the “Dismissive” group reported that they were

less uncertain than any other group about the science of climate
change and more likely than any other group to say that they were
well-informed about the subject. While there was “low” recognition
of the extent of scientific agreement on climate science among all the
respondents, only five percent of the Disengaged, Doubtful, and
Dismissive recognized the actual levels of scientific agreement on the
subject. Not surprisingly, these groups were also far less likely to
trust expert scientific groups on the subject of climate change.239
If a hardening of opinion is indeed occurring, one wonders if it is
associated with changes in the way voters obtain information.

239. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE UNIVERSITY’S PROJECT ON CLIMATE
CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N,
GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS IN MAY 2011, at 6–7 (2011) available at
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/SixAmericasMay2011.pdf.
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Behavioral psychologists have long documented the tendency of
humans to seek affirmation of their preexisting views.240 Is this easier
to do in the information age? In the 1970s, most voters got their
policy and political information from the relatively few (and largely
mainstream) news sources available. Now voters face a much wider
variety of news sources. This means that voters can find more and
better information if they are willing to look for it. It also means that
it is much easier for voters to find information sources that are
tailored to their particular point of view or which tend to confirm
their worldviews.241 In the Yale/George Mason report, those on the
left hand side of the climate change opinion spectrum reported more
interest in gathering new information about climate change than
those on the right hand side of the spectrum. If those on the right
are turning a blind eye to climate change science, this dynamic makes
it harder for political entrepreneurs to move public opinion, thereby
reducing the likelihood of an energy policy reform republican
moment in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM HERE?
All of this sounds very pessimistic. Even if it is true that the
benefits of energy policy reform exceed the costs, it seems as though
the truth cannot prevail. Have organized interests become too adept
at exploiting voters’ rational ignorance and psychological
predispositions? Are voters unwilling to face “inconvenient truths”
and/or make the investments necessary to prevent harm to future
generations? Or is it simply that these issues are not yet politically
mature, such that the voting public does not yet fully understand or
appreciate the kind of fundamental energy policy reforms Congress is
now considering?
First, we should remember that the absence of congressional
action is not the absence of progress. Significant minorities of the
American public are activated on energy policy reform issues and are

240. See PINKER, supra note 177.
241. Some offer this as an explanation for increasing political polarization generally. See,
e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBER: BUSH V. GORE, IMPEACHMENT AND BEYOND (2001).
Margaret Heffernan argues that the issue of climate change is beset by this problem, that we
are willfully blind because the conflict between the comfort we derive from cheap fossil-fueled
energy and the fact that global warming produces more cognitive dissonance than we can
handle. So we seek out news sources that remove that dissonance. See MARGARET
HEFFERNAN, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: WHY WE IGNORE THE OBVIOUS AT OUR PERIL (2011).
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pressing forward in other policymaking arenas. As noted above, in
the absence of congressional action states have begun to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions and establish RPS within their borders.242
Even if Congress is not yet ready to mandate energy-efficient new
building codes, states have begun adopting model building efficiency
codes that will significantly reduce energy consumption within
buildings.243 Private litigants have begun using theories of tort
liability to sue emitters of greenhouse gases, although those efforts
suffered a recent setback when the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed
nuisance actions brought against greenhouse gas emitters by the
state of Connecticut.244 As I have noted, the Obama EPA has begun
to regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under the Clean Air
Act.245 This is to say nothing of the myriad private and voluntary
efforts aimed at a cleaner, more secure, more efficient, and more
reliable energy future.246 Indeed, some analysts believe that
individual private action may eventually do far more to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions than the regulation of larger sources ever
will. According to Michael Vandebergh and Anne Steinmann,
behaviors over which individuals have direct, substantial control
account for about 4.1 trillion pounds of emissions of CO2 equivalent
per year. This comprises almost a third of total emissions and
represents more than the entire emissions of the United States

242. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
243. See U.S. Dep’t. of Energy, Status of State Energy Codes, BUILDING ENERGY CODES
PROGRAM, http://www.energycodes.gov/states/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (providing maps
and current status for commercial and residential building energy codes operable at state
levels).
244. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (affirming a
trial court’s dismissal of public nuisance claims brought by state governments against coal-fired
power plant owners seeking to enjoin the emission of greenhouse gases from those facilities).
The Second Circuit had held that the district court erred in dismissing global warming claims
premised on the federal common law of nuisance as nonjusticiable. Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding plaintiffs had standing to proceed
with claims for damages caused by global warming based on state common law claims of
nuisance, trespass, and negligence).
245. See supra note 35. Indeed, the EPA has already imposed greenhouse gas emissions
in some Clean Air Act Permits. See San Francisco Area Regulators Include Greenhouse Gas Caps
in Power Plant Permit, 41 ENV’T REP. 288 (2010).
246. These are too numerous to list. They include voluntary action on the part of
companies to reduce their environmental (including carbon) footprints and use energy more
efficiently, and private sector pressure groups who try to induce companies and their products
to become greener, etc.
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industrial sector.247 If political entrepreneurs can activate norms of
conservation and efficiency in individual actors, it might prove as
effective a tool of reform as any mandate. Furthermore, even if the
prospects are bleak for fundamental energy policy reform in the near
term, the mere fact that public support is currently insufficient to
produce a republican moment in Congress does not mean that this
will always be the case. Not only will all of these state, local, and
private efforts continue to bring real (albeit incremental) progress on
issues at the core of energy policy reform, they are also controversial
and are provoking reactions from opponents of reform. As a result,
the issues at the core of reform will remain a part of the public
debate.
Furthermore, if that interim progress remains insufficient,
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will continue
to increase and the United States will remain dependent on foreign
sources of energy. Presumably, this means that mankind will
experience more and more of the adverse effects of this state of
affairs, further increasing the salience of these issues in the minds of
American voters. Indeed, this process ought to produce more of the
kinds of catalyzing events that activate voters to mobilize in favor of
reform: the modern equivalents of the Cuyahoga River fire or Santa
Barbara oil spill. Likewise, Americans will continue to experience the
costs associated with dependence upon oil imports and world
markets for oil—markets that may once again be disrupted for
geopolitical reasons. We can expect growing pressure on the United
States from our allies (particularly among the world’s industrialized
democracies) to take stronger action to develop cleaner, more
efficient energy sources.248 That international pressure, in turn, might
stimulate real movement toward cooperative solutions that include
developing countries like India and China. A worsening situation
might create an environment in which both the developed and the
developing countries are more willing to bargain and sacrifice in
order to develop a cooperative solution to climate change and other
pressing energy issues.
The American policymaking process was not built for speed; to
the contrary, it was built to resist demands for change from

247. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 96, at 1693–94.
248. American public opinion already lags behind that of most industrialized democracies
on this issue.
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temporary “factions” and to respond instead only to the permanent
interests of the larger community. So far, at least, Congress does not
yet recognize the need for a costly transition to cleaner energy,
energy independence, or greater efficiency and reliability as among
the public’s permanent interests.249 Relying upon a worsening
situation to generate the political will to act is not a happy prospect.
However, if the experts are correct that the costs of inaction exceed
the costs of action, we can expect the march of time to help voters
come to understand the costs of inaction; in that event, we can
expect increasing percentages of voters to support fundamental
energy policy reform over time.

249. Of course, the statement implies that the legislative process does not respond to
factions and does respond to permanent interests, which certainly is arguable. Perhaps a more
precise way to put it would be to say that public support for fundamental energy policy reform
has not yet grown sufficiently strong to overcome the impediments the Framers built into the
American legislative process, irrespective of whether those impediments serve the purposes the
Framers intended.
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